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A. Introduction: The Legal and Human
Challenge of State Successions
Throughout history the death and birth of states has been a bloody
process, usually fuelled by ethnic hatred and often entailing the commission of mass atrocities against vulnerable minority groups. Perhaps
because the most recent wave of state dismemberment has been the first
to take place under the glare of global media, widespread revulsion at
the human suffering has followed. A new term, "ethnic cleansing", has
been coined to describe an ancient practice, and public pressure has
mounted on politicians and diplomats to do more than the traditional
* Jeffrey L. Blackman, J.D., (George Washington University, 1990, cum laude),
LL.M. (University of London, London School of Economics, 1997, with highest distinction),
is an attorney and consultant to several international organizations and companies through
Amicus Consulting in the Netherlands. Most recently, Mr. Blackman served as a legal consultant to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the nationality law of
Ukraine and its impact on formerly deported persons and their descendants. He was the legal
consultant to UNHCR on the nationality laws of the Czech and Slovak Republics and their
impact on statelessness. He has previously served as an advisor to the Czech Government on
issues of international developmental assistance, has worked on development programs in
Central and Eastern Europe on grants from the United States Government and the Soros
Foundations, and was a litigation attorney and lobbyist in Washington, D.C.
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exchange of measured protests. As a result, governments and international organizations are grasping for mechanisms with which to redress
the ethnic conflict that propelled the latest round of state collapses and
to ameliorate the ethnic tensions that continue to bedevil many of the
newly-emerged states.' Lawyers and legal scholars, for their part, are
asked to take up the fragile tools of public international law in support
of this effort.
Such is the context in which scholarly2 and political3 interest in the
international law of state succession has been rekindled. Partially as a
result of this specific context, a general consensus has emerged that the
law of state succession can no longer remain in its undeveloped condition, especially with respect to persons living on the territory affected by
succession.4 Although previous efforts to codify and develop the law of
state succession resulted in two international conventions, neither of
these conventions has entered into force.' Nor does either convention
address the issue of the inhabitants of the affected territory-or the central question of what nationality to ascribe to these people. Even if these
conventions were in force, moreover, and even if they addressed issues
related to the affected inhabitants, they would not be binding on successor states, which as newly-created subjects of international law are not
signatories to these (or most other) international instruments. Rather,
new states are bound initially only by those norms that form part of
customary international law, which does not include the provisions of

1. Such mechanisms include the creation, as a mechanism for conflict prevention, of
the post of the High Commissioner for National Minorities of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE") at the 1992 Helsinki Summit. See Conference on Security and Co-operationin Europe: Declaration and Decisionsfrom Helsinki Summit, 10 July
1992, reprinted in 31 ILM 1385 (1992). Also see U.N. Security Council Resolution 808

establishing, as a measure to restore and maintain international peace and security, an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993).
2. See, for example, Rein MUllerson, New Developments in the Former USSR and
Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 299 (1993), and related articles in the same volume as part of
a symposium on state succession, especially Oscar Schachter, State Succession: The Once
and Future Law, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 253, 243 (1993), and Detlev Vagts, State Succession: the
Codifiers'iew,33 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1993).
3. See, e.g., State Succession and Relations with Federal States, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
86TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASIL 1 (1992) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL].

4. The territory affected by state succession refers to the territory of predecessor and
successor states.
5. The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 80/31 (1978), reprinted in BLACKSTONE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS 244

(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 3rd. ed. 1991); The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 117/14 (April 7, 1983),

reprintedin 22 ILM 306 (1983).
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the two Vienna Conventions.6 The international law of state succession
is inadequate, especially with regard to the people who must live
through these often tumultuous changes of sovereignty.
Efforts are currently underway to develop and codify the law in this
area. The U.N. General Assembly, "in the light of the situation prevailing in Eastern Europe," placed on the agenda of the International Law
Commission ("ILC" or "Commission") the issue of "state succession
and its impact on the nationality of natural and legal persons. 7 Four reports have been prepared (three by the Special Rapporteur and one by
the Working Group) and discussed by the ILC and by the General Assembly's Sixth Committee (on Legal Matters).' Recently, "Draft
Articles on Nationality in relation to the succession of States" 9 were
prepared and submitted for discussion in the current session of the ILC.
These draft articles are intended to take the form of a General Assembly
declaration. °
What is most striking about the deliberations in the ILC and the
Sixth Committee is the growing realization by delegates that the law of
state succession with respect to the nationality of the affected inhabitants must take into account the evolving norms of international human
rights law, particularly those pertaining to statelessness, the right to a
nationality, and the principle of non-discrimination. Several members of
the Commission, for example, have pointed out that only the development of international human rights law has placed any new restraints

6. Mfillerson sums up the matter neatly: "Because of the... presence of some scarce
but contrary practices, these norms [of the two Vienna Conventions] certainly have not since
become norms of customary international law.... New states would be clean slates in rela-

tion to the treaty norms governing state succession, if there were such norms." Milllerson,
supra note 2, at 301.

7. U.N. Doc A/RES/48/31 (1993). The ILC appointed Mr. Viclav Mikulka as its Special Rapporteur on the topic and a Working Group chaired by Mr. Mikulka.
8.

See Viclav Mikulka, FirstReport on State Succession and Its Impact on the Nation-

ality of Natural and Legal Persons, International Law Commission, Forty-seventh Session,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/467 (1995) [hereinafter Mikulka, FirstReport]; Vdclav Mikulka Report of
the Working Group on State Succession and Its Impact on the Nationality of Natural and
Legal Persons, International Law Commission, Forty-seventh Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.507 (1995) [hereinafter Working Group Report]; Vdclav Mikulka, Second Report
on State Succession and Its Impact on the Nationality of Natural and Legal Persons, Interna-

tional Law Commission, Forty-eighth Session, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/474 (1996) [hereinafter
Mikulka, Second Report]; and Vdclav Mikulka, Third Report on Nationality in Relation to

the Succession of States, International Law Commission, Forth-ninth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/480 (1997) [hereinafter Mikulka, Third Report].
9. These are contained in Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 9.
10. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission On the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/51/10, 1 88(b).
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whatsoever on traditional state sovereignty over nationality matters."
The Working Group concluded that the topic under consideration
"involved the basic human right to a nationality, so that obligations for
States stemmed from the duty to respect that right ... ,,12 Some members have even wondered whether it might be possible under
international law to declare acts carried out under domestic law null and
void in cases of extreme gravity, such as when a state divests certain
persons of their nationality as an element in the persecution of an ethnic
minority." Similarly, the General Assembly's Sixth Committee has
highlighted the human rights aspect of the topic and "strongly emphasized" that the ILC's objective should be "the protection of the
individual against any detrimental effects in the area of nationality resulting from State succession, especially statelessness.' 4 As if recognizing
that the legal ground has shifted beneath it, the ILC has renamed the topic
under review from "State Succession and Its Impact on the Nationality of
Natural and Legal Persons" to "Nationality in relation to the succession
of States."'5 The Draft Articles presently under discussion in the ILC
and the Sixth Committee reflect these human rights concerns. These
Draft Articles mark a significant departure from the traditional view,
which has prevailed until recently, that international law places few, if
any, restraints on states' discretion over nationality issues. Indeed, they
mark significant progress from the positions taken in the first two reports of the Special Rapporteur.
The ILC's shift in focus toward human rights principles in considering the law of state succession in this area accords with the approach
of legal practitioners who have been addressing the difficult human consequences of state succession, especially the urgent issues of
statelessness and the protection of ethnic minorities within successor
states.16 The geographical area most recently affected by these problems
11. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission On the Work of Its Forty-Seventh Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/50/10, 188. See also Mikulka, Second
Report, supra note 6, at 9 n.26.
12. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), supra note 10, 80.
13. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), supra note 11, 185.
14. As per the topical summary of discussions held in the Sixth Committee of the Gen-

eral Assembly during its fiftieth session, prepared by the Secretariat. U.N. Doc.
AICN.4/472/Add. 1, 1$ 5-6.

15. U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), supra note 10, 88.
16. See, e.g, Jeffrey L. Blackman, Statelessness in the Czech Republic: The Czech Citizenship Law and its Application (August 1996) (unpublished report to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees); Jeffrey L. Blackman, Statelessness in Ukraine: The
Ukraine Citizenship Law and Its Application to Formerly Deported Persons and Their De-

scendents (unpublished report to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)
(August 1998); Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, The Czech and Slovak
Citizenship Laws and the Problem of Statelessness (February 1996) (unpublished legal
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has been Central and Eastern Europe: the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and the Czech
Republic. 7 But of course, the problems of statelessness and discrimination against ethnic minority groups are by no means confined to Europe,
or for that matter to successor states. Experience gained in the latest
round of European state successions may be relevant to other regions as
well, perhaps starting with Africa, in which some states seem headed for
collapse and division; hence, the timeliness and importance of the ILC's
efforts in developing and codifying the law on this topic. 8
This paper surveys some of the recent developments in international
law relating to nationality and state succession, and suggests a growing
convergence among several legal principles-specifically the principle
of effective nationality, the individual right to a nationality and the corresponding duty of states to prevent statelessness, and the norm of nondiscrimination. At some point this convergence of such diverse areas of
law as nationality, diplomatic protection, and human rights will impose
positive duties on successor states with respect to their inherited populations: namely the duty to secure effective nationality for persons
affected by state succession.
B. The Concept and Function of Nationality
The problem of state succession with respect to the inhabitants of
territory is essentially a problem of nationality, of how to attribute the
nationality of predecessor and successor states among those individuals
affected by the change in sovereignty. Sharpening the concepts and
functions of nationality under discussion is necessary at the outset because the subject of nationality is an aspect of several different areas of
international law and differs among the various domestic legal systems
of states.
opinion); Carol A. Batchelor, UNHCR and Issues Related to Nationality, 14 REFUGEE SURV.

Q. 91 (1995);

THE FOUNDATION ON INTER-ETHNIc RELATIONS, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE

CSCE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON NATIONAL MINORITIES (1994); Erika B. Schlager, The
Rights to Have Rights: Citizenship in Newly Independent OSCE Countries, 8 HELSINKI
MONITOR 19 (1997); Andras Fehervary, Citizenship, Statelessness and Human Rights: Recent Developments in the Baltic States, 5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 392 (1993); Lowell
Barrington, The Domestic and InternationalConsequences of Citizenship in the Soviet Suc-

cessor States, 47 EUROPE-ASIA STUD. 731 (1995); Jelena Pejic, Citizenship and Statelessness
in the Former Yugoslavia: The Legal Framework, 14 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 1 (1995).

17. A former U.S. ambassador to Czechoslovakia aptly described Central Europe as "an
area that produces more history than it can consume locally." PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL,

supra note 3, at 11.
18. Recent state successions have also highlighted many interesting issues with respect
to the human right of peoples to self-determination. See REIN MULLERSON, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, RIGHTS AND POLITICS: DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CIS ch.2 (1994).
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An initial distinction must be drawn between the nationality of natural persons and that of legal persons. The nationality of legal persons is
hereby excluded from consideration. The discussion here concerns not
the national identity of corporations but that of human beings. The reasons for this exclusion are both practical-a paper this length can cover
only so many issues-and substantive-the body of law that has added
the most substance to nationality issues is international human rights
law, which pertains to people, not to corporations. Some might also add
a moral dimension, that problems faced by human beings are more
compelling than those faced by corporate entities and therefore deserve
greater consideration.
A further distinction must be drawn between nationality as a legal
term describing membership in a state, and nationality as an ethnological term connoting an historical relationship to a specific ethnic,
linguistic, or racial group. 9 These two concepts of nationality are sometimes coextensive and indistinguishable in practice, particularly in
ethnically homogenous states. For purposes of clarity, however, keeping
the concepts separate is important because one does not necessarily
follow the other. For example, although most Irish nationals in the ethnic sense are also nationals of the Republic of Ireland in the legal sense,
most Irish persons living in Northern Ireland have never been nationals
of the Republic of Ireland; their families have been nationals of the
United Kingdom for generations. Conversely, although most nationals
of Malaysia in the legal sense are ethnic Malays, there is also a significant population of ethnic Chinese, some of whom are Malaysian
nationals in the legal sense, but some of whom still carry the "overseas
nationality" of the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China
(as the case may be). 0 That one of the two concepts of nationality may
predominate over the other is also possible, as is the case in the United
States, in which nationality does not rest significantly on a notion of a
specific ethnic identity, or in Bosnia, in which ethnic nationality is far
more important than nationality in the Bosnian Republic.
The interplay between the two concepts is perhaps most interesting
in states which have internal administrative units based on ethnic or
tribal lines (whether or not the states are federal structures). For example, nationals of the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic never
regarded themselves as "Czechoslovaks;" they were always either Czechs
or Slovaks (and indeed, decided to dissolve their shared federation and
19. See PAUL WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d.

ed. 1979).
20. Carol A. Batchelor, Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection, 7
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 232, 233 (1995).
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form separate states along ethnic lines). On the other hand, the Czech Republic consists of ethnic Czechs, Moravians, and Silesians, with
administrative units specific to Moravia, and with Silesia including a
separate Polish-speaking linguistic community. Yet the large majority
within each of the three groupings regard themselves as Czech, ethnically and politically, despite their separate characteristics. Similarly,
nationals of the Democratic Republic of Congo (until recently the Republic of Zaire) appeared, at least until recently, to consider themselves
Zairians, despite the presence of some two hundred historical, linguistic,
and ethnic (or tribal) groupings, and despite Zaire's/Congo's heritage as
a recent de-colonial creation.
Obviously, the ethnological concept of nationality blurs into the notion of distinct minority groups, and the process by which a given
minority group develops a sense of shared identity as a separate people
or nation is complex and fascinating. But that process and that ethnic
concept of nationality must be kept separate from the process of creating a nation-state and the concept of nationality as legal membership
therein. The subject under review-nationality as it relates to state succession-refers almost exclusively to this latter concept of nationality."'
Despite the necessity of distinguishing between the ethnological
concept of nationality and the legal concept of nationality, for purposes
of legal discussion, the two concepts are quite naturally related in practice. The International Court of Justice offered perhaps the most
satisfying definition of nationality by acknowledging both its legal and
political aspects as well as its social and cultural dimensions:
"[N]ationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments,
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties."22
The most important distinction for our purposes is that between nationality under domestic law and nationality as a matter of international
law. Nationality is created under domestic law. Nationality is a legal
relationship between an individual and a state, "conferring mutual rights

21. This conception of nationality as a legal relationship is admittedly an Anglo-Saxon
perspective, drawn from Lockean traditions of the social contract among subjects and state.
Weis also discusses the Roman conception of nationality, which posits nationality as a legal
status, with rights and obligations following as a consequence of birth. WEIS, supra note 19,
at 30. But this conception fails to take into account the process of naturalization or the process of option in the context of state succession, by which individuals and states form the
bond of nationality by affirmative act of will. The better definition, therefore, is that of a
legal relationship. Under either conception, however, nationality is essentially the legal
manifestation of a bond between a state and an individual, whether acquired by birth, adoption, marriage, or affirmative choice.
22. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. 23.
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and duties on both." 3 Nationality is the means by which an individual
acquires and exercises the rights and responsibilities of membership
within the state. As such, nationality is the prerequisite for the realization of other fundamental rights. Nationality has aptly been called
"man's basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to have rights. 24
Because domestic law creates nationality, its specific form and substance varies from state to state. Membership in one state carries a
different set of rights and obligations, within a different legal framework, than does membership in another state. Thus, for example,
nationals of the Swiss Confederation have a different legal relationship
to their federal state and local canton than do nationals of the People's
Republic of China, and the substantive rights and duties that flow from
nationality in each state also differ greatly. The form and substance of
domestic nationality may also vary within a given state, for example,
within those states which allocate different bundles of rights and duties
according to different categories of domestic nationality., One example
of this variance is the United States, in which "citizens" are accorded
full political and civil rights, and "nationals" are inhabitants of U.S. territorial possessions (e.g., Guam, Puerto Rico, Samoa) but have
substantially reduced rights than do full citizens (e.g., they cannot vote
in national elections).
Traditionally, for purposes of international law, these internal nationality categories were not considered legally relevant. International
law governs the rights and duties of states; it is thus more concerned
with the formal designation of state nationality for purposes of interstate relations, than with its internal functions. Or as Weis puts it,
"[n]ationality in the sense of international law is a technical term denoting the allocation of individuals, termed nationals, to a specific
State-the State of nationality-as members of that State, a relationship
which confers upon the State of nationality ... rights and duties in relation to other States." 27 In other words, nationality in international law is
the mechanism by which states designate individuals to themselves in

23. WEtS, supra note 19, at 59.
24. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, WINNING

THE HUMAN RACE? 107 (1988) (quoting former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Earl
Warren).
25. See WEIS, supra note 19, at 4-9.
26. I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE 851 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts

eds., 9th ed. 1992).
27. WEIS, supra note 19, at 59.
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dealing with other states; inquiring beyond this designation into possible
internal categories of state nationality is not necessary."
The purpose served by the designation of nationality is to enable
states to exercise clear jurisdiction over individuals. Nationality functions to indicate which states may exercise jurisdiction over which
individuals. In O'Connell's words, "[t]he expression 'nationality' in international law is only shorthand for the ascription of individuals to
specific States for the purpose either of jurisdiction or of diplomatic
protection. In the sense that a person falls within the plenary jurisdiction
of a State, and may be represented by it, such a person is said to be a
national of that State."
From this definition it is clear that the function of nationality under
international law-the legal and political ascription of individuals to
states-is fundamentally an attribute of state sovereignty, closely analogous to the function of international borders as the legal ascription of
territory to states. The state exercises its sovereignty over both its borders and its nationals, and other states which infringe upon either bear
responsibility therefor. Thus if a state harms the national of another
state, it has committed a delict against the other state by infringing upon
its sovereignty, and bears responsibility to that state therefor. This is the
principle of state responsibility, central to international law. Conversely,
a state whose national has been harmed by another state acquires rights
to assert against the other state arising from the infringement upon its
sovereignty. These are the related principles of diplomatic protection
and the nationality of claims, central to the place of individuals within
public international law. 0
Because of its relationship to the basic principles of state responsibility, nationality of claims, and diplomatic protection, nationality also
plays an important role in many substantive areas of international law.
For example, in one of the oldest areas of international law, the law of
armed conflict, nationality is a significant basis for determining the
categories (e.g., who are belligerents, who are neutrals) upon which turn
some of the most important substantive law provisions (e.g., the application of capital punishment, the treatment of prisoners of war, the

28. That is not to say that international law does not look behind the formal designation
of nationality to assess the factual connection between the individual and the state. See the
Nottebohm discussion, infra pp. 11-14.
29. I D.P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW 498 (1967).
30. Ian Brownlie, The Relations of Nationality in Public InternationalLaw, 1963 BRIT.

Y.B. INT'L L. 284, 290.
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protection of non-combatants, state responsibility for war criminals).'
Similarly, in the area of international refugee law, nationality plays an
important role in determining the country of origin, upon which refugee
status is grounded and the central protections of asylum and nonrefoulement operate.
Several observations arise from the foregoing discussion on the
concept and function of nationality under international law. First and
most significantly, it is clear that nationality is the individual's primary
link to the operation of international law. In a state-centric international
legal system, the state is still the primary vehicle by which the individual accesses the rights and protections available under international law;
the individual's nationality in a state is the mechanism by which that
state may exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the individual under international law. Thus, just as domestic citizenship is the
prerequisite for acquiring and exercising civil and political rights within
a state-the right to have rights-so too nationality in a state is the sine
qua non for exercising most rights the individual has under international
law.
To be stateless, to be without the nationality of any state, is thus a
particularly grave situation. Without the link of nationality, states may
not effectively exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of an individual.
Other than certain international organizations in limited circumstances
(e.g., the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees), the stateless person
has no vehicle for exercising rights or obtaining protections available
under international law. International law is essentially rendered inoperable for the stateless individual.
Finally, it is interesting to consider the reason for this "allocation"
of individuals to states. Why is it that we individuals need to be nationals of a state, to be subject to a state's jurisdiction? If the answer is to
enable the state to exercise protection on our behalf, then the question
follows, why do we individuals need states to protect us? The answer
appears to be this: without the protection of a state other states would
seek to exercise their jurisdiction over us. To live without a nationality
and go unmolested by one state or another seems not to be an option.
One might therefore think of nationality as a global protection racket
31. See generally Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; 1949
Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, all reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds. 2nd ed. 1995).
32. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Articles I(A)(2), 1(C)(1)-(3),
and 33, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS 638 (1994) [hereinafter U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS).
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run by states. That kind of statement, while facetious, goes a long way
toward explaining the continuing resistance by states to international
restrictions on their freedom to define the rules of their own domestic
nationality game.
Nationality questions lie at the moving fault line between domestic
state sovereignty and the evolving international legal system. Within the
latter, nationality straddles an intersection of several substantive bodies
of law related to diplomatic protection, state responsibility, and international human rights. Unsurprisingly, states jealously guard their prerogatives over nationality issues.
C. The TraditionalView: State Discretionover Nationality Issues
Given states' reluctance to cede sovereignty over nationality issues,
it has long been axiomatic that under international law-a body of law
created by states and for states-questions of nationality fall within the
domestic jurisdiction of individual states. In 'part states retain this
authority because nationality within a state is created as a function of
domestic law. There is no such thing as international nationality.33
Professor Brownlie finds evidence for the traditional view dating
back to the 19th century, although perhaps this view's most widely
quoted expression is found in Oppenheim's International Law, which
states that "[i]t is not for international law but for the internal law of
each State to determine who is, and who is not, to be considered its national."35
International instruments have reflected this view. For example, Article 1 of the Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws36 ("1930 Hague Convention") provided, inter alia: "It
is for each State to determine under its own laws who are its nationals."
Article 2 added that "[a]ny question as to whether a person possesses
the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance
with the law of that State."
International judicial authorities have also affirmed this view, most
famously in the oft-quoted dictum from the Permanent Court of
33. Although there is such a thing as citizenship in the European Union, citizenship is
grounded on the individual's nationality within one of the member states, a question determined solely by the member states' domestic nationality legislation. See Article 8, Treaty on
European Union 31 I.L.M. 259 (1992); Declaration on Nationality of a Member State, id. at
365.
34. See Brownlie, supra note 30, at 286 n.2.
35. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 26, at 852. Brownlie conducts an
interesting textual exegesis on this famous passage by comparing it with its original formulation in 1905 in the first edition of Oppenheim's. Brownlie, supra note 30, at 289.
36. 1930 Hague Convention, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 (1937).
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International Justice ("PCIJ") in its advisory opinion concerning the
Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees: "[I]n the present state of
international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of the
within this reserved domain [of domestic
Court, in principle
'
jurisdiction]. 07
In the context of state succession, the traditional view holds that the
nationality of individuals affected by a change in sovereignty must be
determined by the domestic law of the states concerned. O'Connell
stated the principle as follows: "It is the municipal law of the predecessor State which is to determine which persons have lost their nationality
as a result of the change [in sovereignty]; it is that of the successor State
which is to determine which persons have acquired its nationality."38
Article 13 of the Bustamante Code likewise sought to apply this
principle to the specific contexts of state successions (sometimes referred to as "collective naturalizations"):
In collective naturalizations, in case of the independence of a
State, the law of the acquiring or new State shall apply, if it has
established in the territory an effective sovereignty which has
been recognized by the State trying the issue, and in the absence
thereof that of the old State, all without prejudice to the contractual stipulations between the two interested States, which
shall always have preference.39
Not surprisingly, international lawyers have bridled at the notion of
state discretion over nationality matters. Brownlie, for example, has
creatively searched out several areas of international law-including the
delimitation by states of exclusive sea areas, as discussed in the Norwegian Fisheries case, automatic reservations of domestic jurisdiction to
states' acceptances of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction, and derogation clauses in human rights instruments-to construct the following
argument: "[T]o leave issues to the unilateral determination of States
is to give them the power to contract out of the very system of legal
obligation .... [N]one of the alternative systems of accommodating
state policies is likely to be an adequate substitute for the use of limitations derivative from the existing rules of international law." ° Thus,
37. 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24; see also Acquisition of Polish Nationality, 1923

P.C.I.J. (set. B) No. 7, at 16 ("[lt is true that a sovereign State has the right to decide what
persons shall be regarded as its nationals ....); Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, at 19.
38. O'CONNELL, supra note 29, at 501.
39. Code of Private International Law ("Code Bustamante"), quoted in Mikulka, First
Report, supra note 8, at 21.
40. Brownlie, supra note 30, at 293-94.
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he argues, exclusive domestic jurisdiction is incompatible with the international legal system and ought to be rejected as a matter of
conception and policy.
Brownlie may well be correct, as he now appears to be on other
points related to nationality in state succession."' Unfortunately, scholarly arguments, while stimulating, are not frequently found persuasive
by states when evaluating their freedom to act under international law.
Fortunately, at least for those who support limitations on state sovereignty, the treaty and judicial authorities that affirmed state discretion
over nationality issues also indicated the existence of limitations on that
discretion.
Limits on state discretion over nationality matters were inherent as
early as the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees case. Although the
PCIJ upheld the principle that nationality questions are reserved to
states' domestic jurisdiction, the PCIJ also made clear that the question
was a relative one, dependent on the development of international law:
The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within
the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it
depends upon the development of international relations. Thus,
in the present state of international law, questions of nationality
are, in the opinion of this Court, in principle within this reserved
domain."
The Court left open the possibility that in the future international
law might evolve to impose restrictions on state discretion over nationality issues:
For the purpose of the present opinion, it is enough to observe
that it may well happen that, in a matter which, like that of nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by international law, the
right of a State to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by
obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States.
In such a case, jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs solely to
the State, is limited by rules of international law.43

41. His argument that the principle of genuine effective link to the territory should
oblige successor states to confer nationality on the territory's inhabitants appears to have
come to fruition in the Draft Articles. See, e.g., The Draft Articles on Nationality in relation
to the Succession of States, art. 17, 20(a), 23, in Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 9,
15-17. His position that the principle of effective nationality should be recognized as a general principle of international law has also received support in the current ILC deliberations.
42. 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24.

43. Id.
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Much commentary has been devoted to these passages of dictum
and how they affect nationality law.44 The PCIJ, however, was addressing a very specific question on the facts within the framework of the
League of Nations system-namely whether a dispute between France
and Great Britain over French nationality decrees in Tunis and Morocco
was, to the extent these decrees affected British nationals, "solely a
matter of domestic jurisdiction" of the state within the meaning of Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 45 Because resolution
of the dispute turned on the interpretation of several international treaties concerning the territories and population in question, the Court held
that the decrees were not solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction. Despite these narrow grounds, the Court's dictum in the case has been
widely cited in the literature and in subsequent judicial opinions in support of two broader propositions: (i) that state discretion over nationality
issues is subject to international limitations, and that (ii) these limitations evolve along with the development of international law.
The Court's approach was echoed by the 1929 Draft Convention on
Nationality prepared by Harvard Law School's Research on International Law, Article 2 of which provided that "each State may determine
by its law who are its nationals, subject to the provisions of any special
treaty to which the State may be a party; but under international law the
power of a State to confer its nationality is not unlimited."
The existence of limitations on State discretion over nationality issues was also acknowledged in the 1930 Hague Convention. Although
Article 1 reaffirmed that "[i]t is for each state to determine under its
own law who are its nationals", it immediately qualified this by adding
that each state's nationality law "shall be recognized by other States in
so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international
custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to
nationality. '47 Article 1 thus simultaneously asserts the principle of state
discretion over nationality questions and the principle of international
limitations on state discretion-without specifying what those limitations might be. What is clear is the form international limitations will
take: non-recognition by other states. And from the Tunis and Morocco
44. See generally OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 26, at 852; Brownlie,
supra note 30, at 285-89; Johannes M.M. Chan, The Right to a Nationality as a Human
Right, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1991); Weis, supra note 19.

45. A good discussion of the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees case can be found
in WEIS, supra note 19, at 71-75.
46. Draft Conventions and Comments Preparedby the Research in InternationalLaw of
the Harvard Law School on: The Law of Nationality, 23 AM. J. INT'L. L. 11, 13 (1929)
[hereinafter Draft Conventions and Comments].
47. League of Nations Treaty Series, supra note 36, at 99.
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Nationality Decrees case it could be deduced that one of the substantive
limitations was on a state's ability to impose its nationality on another
state's nationals, a limitation that was discussed in the Preparatory
Committee of The Hague Codification Conference, but not made explicit in Article 1 of the Convention."
D. Nottebohm and the Principleof Effective Nationality
An additional substantive limitation, again taking the form of nonrecognition by other states, was elaborated by the ICJ in its Nottebohm
decision.49 That case involved proceedings by Liechtenstein on behalf of
Nottebohm, a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein, for damages arising
from the acts of Guatemala. The Court ruled the claim inadmissible,
holding that Nottebohm lacked the real and effective links with Liechtenstein on which Liechtenstein could exercise diplomatic protection on
his behalf:
Naturalization was asked for not so much for the purpose of
obtaining a legal recognition of Nottebohm's membership in
fact in the population of Liechtenstein, as it was to enable him
to substitute for his status as a national of the belligerent State
[of Germany] that of a national of a neutral State, with the sole
aim of thus coming within the protection of Liechtenstein but
not of becoming wedded to its traditions, its interests, its way of
life, or of assuming its obligations.... Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted in such circumstances 0
In effect, the Court held that under international law the objective
legal status of nationality, by itself, no longer conferred sufficient title
on which a state could exercise diplomatic protection in respect of its
nationals. Instead, the Court looked beyond objective nationality to ascertain whether there was also an effective nationality-whether the

48. The reply of the German Government of 1929 to the Preparatory Committee:

[A] state has no power... to confer its nationality on all the inhabitants of another
State or on all foreigners entering its territory ... if the State confers its nationality
on the subjects of other States without their request, when the persons concerned
are not attached to it by any particular bond, as, for instance, origin, domicile or
birth, the States concerned will not be bound to recognize such naturalisation.
Conference for the Codification of International Law: Bases of Discussion , Nationality,

League of Nations Doc. C.73.M.38 1929 V, at 13 (1929), quoted in Brownlie, supra note 30,
at 350.
49. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. 23. An excellent discussion of the Nottebohm case can be
found in BROWNLIE, supra note 30, at 349-364.
50. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. 23, 26.
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legal status as national accorded with the factual ties between the person
and the state concerned:
International arbitrators have decided in the same way numerous cases of dual nationality, where the question arose with
regard to the exercise of protection. They have given their preference to the real and effective nationality, that which accorded
with the facts, that based on stronger factual ties between the
person concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved. Different factors are taken into consideration, and their
importance will vary from one case to the next: the habitual
residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but
there are other factors such as the centre of his interests, his
family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by
him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc."
Where the requisite factual ties were lacking between an individual
and a state, as was the case between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein, the
Court held that the state had no right, under international law, to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of the person concerned-or more
precisely, that other states had no obligation to recognize the nationality
conferred in the absence of such ties: "[a] State cannot claim that the
rules it has thus laid down are entitled to recognition by another State
unless it has acted in conformity with this general aim of making the
legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's genuine connection with the State. 52
Several observations on the Nottebohm decision are worth making
here. First, it is useful to bear in mind how the effective nationality principle discussed above applies in the specific context of state succession.
O'Connell, in a widely cited passage, put it this way:
There must be a sufficient link between the successor State and
the persons it claims as its nationals in virtue of the succession,
and the sufficiency of the link might be tested if the successor
State attempted to exercise a jurisdiction over those persons in
circumstances disapproved of by international law, or attempted

51. Id. at 22. Note the Court's use in this passage of arbitral awards in the context of
dual nationality, in a case in which only one nationality was involved. This aspect of the
Court's reasoning, along with its cavalier survey of state practice, has been rightly criticized
in the dissenting opinions and in the literature. See, id. at 41-42 (Judge Read's dissent opinion); BROWNLIE, supra note 30, at 353-358.
52. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. 23.
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to represent them diplomatically; provided, that is, there is some
State competent to protest on behalf of the persons concerned. 3
Mikulka's summary of the law in this area nicely illustrates the interplay between a state's legitimate exercise of domestic jurisdiction
over nationality issues and that state's assertion of that exercise viz.
other states:
One of the functions of international law in respect of nationality is to delimit the competence of States in this field. In
situations of State succession, this means the delimitation of the
competence of the predecessor State to retain certain persons as
its nationals and the competence of the successor State to grant
its nationality to certain persons. Thus international law permits
a certain degree of control over unreasonable attribution by
States of their nationality.... This is achieved by depriving an
abusive exercise by a State of its legislative competence with respect to nationality of much of its international effect, or in
other words, by eliminating its consequences as regards third
States.'
Second, the validity of Nottebohm's nationality under Liechtenstein's domestic legal system was not at issue in the case and was not
affected by the Court's judgment. Nor was the validity of Liechtenstein's nationality legislation directly in dispute.5 What was in dispute
was Liechtenstein's claim to represent Nottebohm under the international law of diplomatic protection, specifically before the ICJ, on the
basis of Nottebohm's status as a Liechtenstein national. Liechtenstein
was free to treat Nottebohm as its national for domestic law purposes;
Liechtenstein could not expect other states do so for purposes of international law.56
53. O'CONNELL, supra note 29, at 499.
54. Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 98-99.
55. Indeed, the Court affirmed that
[i]t is for Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that
nationality in ... accordance with that legislation.... Furthermore, nationality has
its most immediate ... and, for most people its only[,] effects within the legal
system of the State conferring it.... The naturalization of Nottebohm was an act
performed by Liechtenstein in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction.
Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. 20-21.
56.
But the issue which the Court must decide is not one which pertains to the legal
system of Liechtenstein. It does not depend on the law or on the decision of
Liechtenstein whether that State is entitled to exercise its protection.... To exercise protection, to apply to the Court, is to place oneself on the plane of
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In relation to nationality law, then, the international limitations on
state discretion affirmed in Nottebohm remained negative in character,
taking the form of non-recognition by other international subjects. The
Court did not introduce obligations on states regarding their exercise of
domestic jurisdiction over nationality issues; nor did the Court assert
any dramatic positive rights of individuals with respect to nationality
claims viz. states-such as that an individual with genuine effective
links to a state has a right to the nationality of that state. The nature of
the limitations remained negative and tied to the specific context of
diplomatic protection. For all the criticism directed at the Court's reasoning in Nottebohm-its reliance on arbitral tribunal decisions, its
scant reference to state practice, its importing of principles governing
dual nationality into a case of single nationality, its failure to further
elaborate the criteria of effective nationality-the result was very much
in keeping with the PCIJ's opinion in Tunis and Morocco Decrees
(albeit with a far different procedural posture) and with the 1930 Hague
Convention.57 Although Nottebohm did expand the scope in which international law refused to give effect to a state's attribution of
nationality-from cases in which states imposed nationality on the nationals of other states (as in the Tunis and Morocco Decrees case) to
cases in which states conferred nationality on willing individuals who
lacked a sufficient connection to that state-the expansion was incremental. It was a matter of degree rather than a dramatic reach into the
domestic jurisdiction of states over nationality issues.
Nevertheless, Nottebohm marked a significant break with precedent
in relation to the law of diplomatic protection, severing diplomatic protection from nationality without pausing a great deal to consider state
practice. The decision has been criticized in this regard for introducing
uncertainty into diplomatic protection and for doing so on the basis of
indefinite criteria:

international law. It is international law which determines whether a State is entitled to exercise protection and to seise the Court.
Id. at 20-21.
57. Article 5 of the Hague Convention applied the principle of effective link to the context of multiple nationality, although confining its effects to a state's domestic legal system:
Within a third State, a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as
if he had only one.... [A] third State shall, of the nationalities which any such
person possesses, recognise exclusively in its territoryeither the nationality of the
country in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the
country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.
League of Nations Treaty Series, supra note 36 (emphasis added).
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[W]hen a person is vested with only one nationality, which is
attributed to him or her either jure sanguinisor jure soli, or by a
valid naturalization entailing the positive loss of the former nationality, the theory of effective nationality cannot be applied
without the risk of causing confusion. It lacks a sufficiently
positive basis to be applied to a nationality which finds support
in a state law. There does not in fact exist any criterion of
proven effectiveness for disclosing the persons by the thousands
who, because of the facility of travel in the modem world, possess the positive legal nationality of a State, but live in foreign
States where they are domiciled and where their family and
business centre is located, would be exposed to non-recognition,
at the international level, of the nationality with which they are
undeniably vested by virtue of the laws of their national State."8
Thus could Judge Read, writing in dissent, state that "apart from the
cases of double nationality, no instance has been cited to the Court in
which a State has successfully refused to recognize that nationality, lawfully conferred and maintained, did not give rise to a right of diplomatic
protection. '59 But as Brownlie rightly notes,' ° Judge Read's qualifying
phrase, "lawfully conferred and maintained," begs the question: What if
nationality had not been lawfully conferred and maintained? Would
states not then be justified in refusing to recognize a state's right of
diplomatic protection on the basis of that unlawful conferral of nationality? And would not an international tribunal likewise be justified in so
refusing a state's claim on the basis of that nationality? Reasoning from
Tunis and Morocco Decrees and the 1930 Hague Convention, it would
be difficult to deny, for example, that the imposition of nationality on
aliens in transit through national territory is unlawful, or that it would be
subject to the non-recognition of other states and international tribunals,
at least in the face of a state's effort to base a claim of diplomatic protection on such nationality.
Moreover, the Court was careful to confine its decision in this regard to the non-recognition by Guatemala of Nottebohm's Liechtenstein
nationality. 61 The Court did not extend its reasoning to non-recognition
by all states, and the decision did not extend to purposes beyond the

58. Flegenheimer Case, Decision No. 182 of the Italian-United States Conciliation
Commission (September 20, 1958), reprinted in 14 UNITED NATIONS, REPORTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 327, 377 [hereinafter R.I.A.A.].
59. WEIS, supra note 19, at 42.
60. Brownlie, supra note 30, at 355.
61. Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 23.
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admissibility of a claim before the ICJ. 62 From a common law perspective, Nottebohm can be viewed as a quite reasonable judgment about
legal standing: that under international law the formal legal status of
nationality, in the absence of genuine effective links between a state and
an individual, is not sufficient to confer standing on a petitioner before
the ICJ.
E. The Principleof Effective Nationality and the Trend
toward Positive Law Obligations
Worth considering is whether the principle of effective nationality
has more than the negative function assigned to it by Nottebohm for the
context of diplomatic protection-specifically, whether the principle of
effective nationality entails positive legal obligations on states in the
context of state succession.
The principle of effective link has long been a part of the discussion
on state succession. Reviewing the early literature on this topic,
O'Connell concluded that
[t]he majority of writers have asserted that upon change of sovereignty the inhabitants of the territory concerned lose the
nationality of the predecessor State and become ipso facto nationals of the successor. There is a collective naturalization
which takes place the moment ratifications of a treaty of cession
are exchanged, or, if there is no treaty, upon the declaration of
annexation or independence.63
O'Connell dismissed this position, however, by noting that "[t]hese
opinions were based upon generally accepted English6 municipal law,
and they are no authority whatever in international law."'
As early as 1929 the Harvard Draft Convention on Nationality supported the position taken by those O'Connell dismissed. Article 18 of
the convention provided that:
When a part of the territory of a State is acquired by another
State ...the nationals of the first State who continue their habitual residence in such territory lose the nationality of that
State and become nationals of the successor State, in the ab62. Indeed, in refusing to apply the effective nationality principle of Nottebohm three
years later in Flegenheimer, the Italian-United States Conciliation Commission held that it
was not in its power to deny the effects at the international level of a nationality conferred by
a State, even without the support of effectivity, except in cases of frauds, negligence or serious error. See 25 I.L.R. 91, 153 (Italian-U.S. Conciliation Commission 1958).
63. O'CONNELL, supra note 29, at 498-501.
64. Id. at 501.
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sence of treaty provisions to the contrary, unless in accordance
with the law of the successor State they decline the nationality
thereof.65
According to the commentary on article 18, This provision was
"believed to express a rule of international law which is generally recognized, although there might be differences of opinion with regard to
its application under particular conditions."
In 1964 Brownlie took up the argument that successor states have an
obligation to confer nationality on nationals of the predecessor state
who have effective links to the territory concerned-in effect, that the
population must go with the territory: "The general principle is that of a
substantial connexion with the territory concerned by citizenship or
residence or family relation to a qualified person. This principle is perhaps merely a special aspect of the general principle of the effective
link."67 He argued in particular that domicile in the territory is the primary criterion for effective nationality in the context of state succession:
[T]he link, in cases of territorial transfer, has special characteristics. Territory, both socially and legally, is not to be regarded
as an empty plot: territory ... connotes population, ethnic
groupings, loyalty patterns, national aspirations, a part of humanity, or, if one is tolerant of the metaphor, an organism....
The population goes with the territory: on the one hand, it
would be illegal, and a derogation from the grant [of territory],
for the transferor to try to retain the population as its own nationals, and, on the other hand, it would be illegal for the
successor to take any steps which involved attempts to avoid responsibility for conditions on the territory, for example, by
treating the population as de facto stateless or by failing to
maintain order in the area. The position is that the population
has a 'territorial' or local status, and this is unaffected whether
there is a universal or partial successor and whether there is a
cession, i.e. a 'transfer' of sovereignty, or a relinquishment by
one State followed by a disposition by international authority."'

65. Draft Conventions and Comments, supra note 46. See also Mikulka, Third Report,
supra note 8, at 18.
66. Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 18.
67. Brownlie, supra note 30, at 324-25.
68. Id. at 325-26. Brownlie's argument here emphasizes domicile as the effective link to
the territory, but it should perhaps not be read to mean that domicile, or habitual residence, is
the sole criterion for evaluating effective nationality. He later expands the concept beyond
domicile, albeit in passing, by noting that "[tihe general principle is that of a substantial
connexion with the territory concerned by citizenship or residence or family relation to a
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Professor O'Connell, one of the most respected writers on matters
of state succession, did not agree that there were any such positive obligations on states: "Undesirable as it may be that any persons become
stateless as a result of a change of sovereignty, it cannot be asserted with
any measure of confidence that international law, at least in its present
stage of development, imposes any duty on the successor State to grant
nationality."69 He argued that the traditional negative restrictions on state
discretion over nationality issues, as enunciated in Nottebohm, were all
that applied in the context of state succession: "The function of international law is at the most to delimit the competence of the [predecessor
State] to retain certain persons as its nationals, and of the [successor
State] to claim them as its own. It cannot prescribe that such persons
change their nationality, either automatically or by submission."70
Undertaking an in-depth examination of state practice, Dr. Weis
likewise found no evidence of a positive rule of international law,
merely a presumption to that effect:
[T]here is no rule of international law under which the nationals
of the predecessor State acquire the nationality of the successor
State. International law cannot have such a direct effect, and the
practice of States does not bear out the contention that this is inevitably the result of the change of sovereignty. As a rule,
however, States have conferred their nationality on the former
nationals of the predecessor State, and in this regard one may
say that there is, in the absence of statutory provisions of municipal law, a presumption of international law that municipal
law has this effect.7
Brownlie disagreed with Weis' assessment of state practice:
"Somewhat surprising is the caution of Dr. Weis in his conclusion on
these issues .... [H]is own survey of State practice, though not perhaps
comprehensive, would seem to make his restraint unnecessary....
Moreover, Dr. Weis has little to offer in the way of contrary practice. 72
In Brownlie's opinion "the evidence is overwhelmingly in support of the
view that the7 population follows the change of sovereignty in matters of
nationality.""
qualified person." Id. at 324. Thus, Brownlie appears to include additional criteria other than
habitual residence to evaluate effective nationality, namely prior nationality and principles of
jus sanguinis.
69. O'CONNELL, supra note 29, at 503.

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 501-02 (citing Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 4).
WEIS, supra note 19, at 143-144.
Brownlie, supra note 30, at 323-324.
Id. at 320.
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There is ample room for argument. But whatever the uniformity of
state practice, it lacks the essential element under international law of
opinio juris. Weis' fine survey of state practice, for example, does not
indicate the existence of opinio juris. Brownlie himself makes no effort
to uncover evidence of opinio juris, despite his sharp disagreement with
Weis' reading of state practice and his broad conclusions grounded on
state practice. Nor is there evidence of opinio juris in the Special Rapporteur's extensive examination of state practice in this area. 74 Although
the overwhelming weight of state practice has been for a successor state
to confer nationality on the nationals of the predecessor state domiciled
on the territory concerned, 7 no evidence demonstrates that states have
conferred nationality in compliance with perceived international legal
obligations to that effect. Moreover, because the conferral of nationality
is accomplished through domestic legislation, indications of uniform
state practice are particularly unreliable. They are nothing more than
snapshots of similar domestic nationality laws in operation. As the Special Rapporteur stated, "[t]he observation that the transfer of sovereignty
to the successor State entailed an automatic and collective change in
nationality for persons residing in its territory and possessing the nationality of the predecessor State seems to address the issue of the
legislative technique used by the State concerned."76 Seen in this light,
uniform legislative techniques for the conferral of nationality are, in the
absence of opinio juris, no more indicative of international law than are
uniform legislative techniques for the issuance of drivers licenses. Uniformity alone is not sufficient to establish a rule of international law.
Nevertheless, the trend in international law, at least in the context of
state succession, is moving in the direction of imposing positive legal
obligations on states deriving from the principle of effective nationality
enunciated in Nottebohm.
International organizations involved in recent state successions have
on several occasions expressed legal opinions to the effect that a successor state is obliged to extend nationality to individuals with a genuine
74. See Mikulka, Second Report, supra note8, at 19-38 (reviewing 31 instances of state
successions on this point, ranging from the territorial transfers from Mexico to the United
States in 1848 to the secession of Eritrea in 1992).
75. The notable exceptions to this are all quite recent: the Czech Republic and the republics of the former Yugoslavia-all of which used the internal citizenship of the
constituent territory of the dissolved federal state as the criterion for conferring nationalityand the three Baltic republics, which conferred nationality on the basis of retroactive application of nationality legislation in force prior to their forcible incorporation into the former
USSR. The case of the Baltic States, however, involves a restoration of legitimate state sovereignty, not technically a state succession, so practice by these states may not necessarily be
instructive.
76. Mikulka, Second Report, supra note 8, at 18-19.
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effective link to the territory in question. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, for example, issued a resolution which "urges that, upon a
change in sovereignty, all persons who have a genuine and effective link
with a new State should acquire the citizenship of that State. ' 77 The
UNHCR also issued a legal opinion "that residence and the genuine effective link [are] the key factors for determination of nationality in the
context of State succession.7 8 In addition, the Committee of Experts on
Nationality of the Council of Europe has incorporated the principle of
effective nationality into its European Convention on Nationality. Article 18(2) of the Convention requires states involved in a succession to
take the following factors into account in determining the nationality of
the individuals concerned:
(a) the genuine and effective link of the person concerned with
the State;
(b)

the habitual residence of the person concerned at the time of
State succession;

(c)

the will of the person concerned;

(d) the territorial origin of the person concerned. 9
A second body of the Council of Europe, the European Commission
for Democracy through Law, has likewise affirmed obligations on successor states based on the principle of effective nationality. The
Declaration on the Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality
of Natural Persons ("Venice Declaration"), adopted in September 1996,
provides in Article 8 that "the successor State shall grant its nationality
to all nationals of the predecessor State residing permanently on the
transferred territory."'
The International Law Commission's current efforts in this area also
point in the direction of positive obligations on states based on the principle of effective nationality, albeit by way of progressive development
of the law rather than codification of lex lata. On the one hand, the ILC
has supported the notion that there are indeed positive obligations on
states:
The fundamental assumption that the successor State is under an
obligation to grant its nationality to a core body of its population
77. The Ottawa Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (July 8, 1995),
quoted in Schlager, supra note 16, at 23.
78. The Czech and Slovak Citizenship Laws and the Problem of Statelessness, supra
note 16, at 12.
79. Document DIR/JUR (96), quoted in Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 20.
80. Document CDL-NAT (96) 7 rev, cited in Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, n.43.
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has been supported both explicitly and implicitly by some representatives in the Sixth Committee [of the General Assembly].
This obligation was considered to be a logical consequence of
the fact that every entity claiming statehood must have a population."
On the other hand, the ILC has not come to a consensus on precisely
what those obligations might be: "[T]he comments of delegations were
inconclusive as to the existence of an international obligation binding
upon the successor State regarding the granting of its nationality following State succession."82 In the views of some representatives, the
principle of effective nationality was irrelevant outside the context of
diplomatic protection.83 Other representatives emphasized the importance of effective nationality and proposed that criteria for establishing a
genuine effective link for each category of state succession should be
studied. 4 Despite the lack of agreement, the Special Rapporteur has
drawn up Draft Articles, based on the deliberations of the Working
Group, which do foresee specific obligations on successor states based
on the principle of effective nationality: "The identification of the rules
governing the distribution of individuals among the States involved in a
succession derives in large part from the application of the principle of
effective nationality to a specific case of State succession."8
The Draft Articles delineate four categories of state succession and
propose specific obligations on successor states which vary by category,
based on varying criteria for establishing a genuine effective link. The
four categories of state succession covered are: (1) the transfer of part of
the territory of a state, (2) the unification of a state, (3) the dissolution
of a state, and (4) the separation of part of the territory. 6 Article 17,
covering the first type of state succession above, provides that "[w]hen
part of the territory of a State is transferred by that State to another
State, the successor State shall grant its nationality to the persons concerned who have their habitual residence in the transferred
territory.... 87 Article 18, covering the unification of states, provides
81. Mikulka, Second Report, supra note 8, at 18.
82. Id. at 19.
83. See Report of the International Law Commission On the Work of Its Forty-Seventh
Session, supra note 11, 187.
84. See id. 186 (suggesting that the Commission be guided by the concept of "rules of
attachment" or "criteria of attachment").
85. Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 3.
86. This categorization reflects the ILC's decision to follow the categories set forth in
the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives
and Debts rather than that in the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect
of Treaties. Id. at 7.
87. Id. at 15.
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that "when two or more States unite and so form one successor State,
..the successor State shall grant its nationality to all persons who, on
the date of the succession of States, had the nationality of at least one of
the predecessor States. '' U Articles 19 and 20, covering state dissolutions,
provide that:
"when a State dissolves and ceases to exist and the various parts
of the territory of the predecessor State form two or more successor States, . . . each of the successor States shall grant its
nationality to ...(a) [p]ersons having their habitual residence in
its territory; and ...(b)(ii) where the predecessor State was a
State in which the category of secondary nationality of constituent entities existed, persons not covered by paragraph (a) who
had the secondary nationality of an entity that has become part
of that successor State, irrespective of the place of their habitual
residence. ' 9
Finally, articles 22 and 23, covering the fourth category above, provide that:
"when part or parts of the territory of a State separate from that
State and form one or more successor States while the predecessor State continues to exist.... the successor State shall grant
its nationality to ...(a) persons having their habitual residence
in its territory; and (b) ...where the predecessor State is a State
in which the category of secondary nationality of constituent
entities existed, persons not covered by paragraph (a) who had
the secondary nationality of an entity that has become part of
that successor State, irrespective of the place of their habitual
residence."'
Hence, the ILC Draft Articles develop positive obligations on successor states based on the principle of effective nationality. The criteria
used for evaluating effective nationality are interesting. Domicile, or
habitual residence, is the predominant criterion used in the Draft Articles. Where, for example, a transfer of part of the territory occurs,
domicile is the criterion used. Only those habitually resident on the transferred territory are entitled to the nationality of the successor state; those
who are residents abroad, including those who obtained their nationality
overseas through principles of jus sanguinis, do not take the nationality of
the successor state. Domicile is used again where a separation of part of
88. Id. at 16.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 17.
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the territory exists; successor states must confer nationality on persons
having habitual residence on the territory. Domicile is also used in the
context of state dissolution, in which the predecessor state ceases to exist-those persons resident on the territory of the successor state take
the nationality of that state. The Commission thus supports Brownlie's
early contention that the population goes with the territory, that habitual
residence entails obligations on successor states to confer nationality:
"[H]abitual residence is the test that has most often been used in practice for defining the basic body of nationals of the successor State, even
if it was not the only one. It is explained by the fact that 'the population
."'91
has a territorial or local status ...
But the ILC has also endorsed other criteria for evaluating effective
nationality in state successions. In the context of the unification of
states, for example, the ILC has dispensed with the domicile criterion
altogether, and has used prior nationality as the criterion for allocating
nationality. Thus, Article 18 would oblige successor states to grant nationality to all former nationals of the predecessor state, whether or not
those nationals are habitually resident on the territory concerned. 92 This
obligation responds to some of the concerns voiced about the habitual
residence test in the past, for example that it "renders only a limited
category of persons susceptible of being invested with the nationality of
the successor State", or that "[p]ersons habitually resident outside the
territory of a State which is totally extinguished become stateless." 93 Article 18 resolves this problem in the context of state unifications by
scrapping habitual residence in favor of prior nationality.
In the context of state dissolution, moreover, the habitual residence
test is supplemented by the criterion of prior internal (or secondary) nationality, which often exists in some federal states, prior legal residence,
as well as prior nationality obtained through principles of jus sanguinis.
Article 22(b) thus seeks to require a state successor in a dissolution to
grant nationality not only to those domiciled on their territory, but also
to "persons ...who had the secondary nationality of an entity that has
91. Id. at 4 (quoting Brownlie, supra note 30, at 325).
92. Id. at 16. This follows the approach of Article 18 of the 1929 Harvard Draft Convention on Nationality, which adopted prior nationality as the criterion for attributing
nationality. Draft Conventions and Comments, supra note 46.
93. O'CONNELL, supra note 29, at 514. Brownlie acknowledged that "[s]ome difficulties
merely concern modalities of the general rule itself. Thus the position of nationals of the
predecessor State who are resident outside the territory the sovereignty of which changes at
the time of the transfer is unsettled." He maintained, nevertheless, that the test of domicile
applied: "The rule probably is that, unless they have or acquire a domicile in the transferred
territory, they do not acquire the nationality of the successor State." Brownlie, supra note 30,
at 324. The ILC has resolved this problem by using a more flexible set of criteria, one that
includes prior nationality and prior secondary nationality.
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become part of that successor State, irrespective of the place of their
habitual residence."9 The article would also oblige states to confer nationality on "persons having their habitual residence in a third State,
who were born in or, before leaving the predecessor State, had their last
permanent residence in what has become the territory of that particular
successor State." 95 This obligation includes persons who acquired the
nationality of the predecessor state through principles of jus sanguinis,
either by birth in the predecessor state or birth overseas to a national of
the predecessor state." Similarly, in the context of the separation and
independence of a part of the territory the habitual residence test is supplemented by the criterion of prior secondary nationality, "persons ...
who had the secondary nationality of an entity that has become part of
that successor State, irrespective of the place of their habitual residence."'
In addition, nationality of the predecessor state is a criterion used in
all four categories of state succession, as is clear from the definition of
"person concerned," which means "every individual who, on the date of
the succession of States, had the nationality of the predecessor State, or
was entitled to acquire such nationality in accordance with the provisions of the internal law of the predecessor State . ,,9"
This criterion is
in keeping with the principle that aliens resident in the territory do not
acquire the nationality of the successor state. As stated by O'Connell,
"[p]ersons habitually resident in the absorbed territory who are nationals
of foreign States and at the same time not nationals of the predecessor
State cannot be invested with the successor's nationality."99 But note the
interesting twist given this concept by the ILC: aliens who were entitled
to acquire the nationality of the predecessor state on the date of succession
are included in the definition of "persons concerned." Thus, in the provisions relating to the four categories of succession, when a state is obliged
to grant nationality to all "persons having their habitual residence in its
94. Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 17 (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. The requirement that persons living overseas "had their last permanent residence in
what has become the territory of that particular successor state" before leaving the predecessor state simply refers to the fact that a state dissolution involves more than one state. The
provision assures that overseas nationals accede to the nationality of the particular successor
state with which they have effective nationality, as determined by where their last habitual
residence was in the home country.
97. Id. (emphasis added). Note that none of the provisions relating to persons with habitual residence overseas requires states to grant their nationality to such persons "if they
have their habitual residence in another State and also have the nationality of that State." Id.
at 11.
98. Id. at 9 n. (h).
99. O'CONNELL, supra note 29, at 517.
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territory," this includes aliens who qualified for, but did not possess, the
nationality of the predecessor state. This element applies to the provisions relating to transfer of part of the territory (article 17), dissolution
of a state (article 20), and separation of part of the territory (article 22).
The inclusion of aliens in the category of persons whose nationality is
affected by state succession appears to be a novelization on the part of
the ILC. The provision certainly represents an expanded application of
the principle of effective nationality. The issue of proof would be problematic in practice. The commentary to the draft article, which is
exhaustive on most points, is silent on this one.
Finally, the Draft Articles would require successor states to make
liberal use of the right of option, which further serves the principle of
effective nationality by ensuring that all persons with effective links to
the territory of the successor state may opt for the nationality of that
state-whether those links consist of domicile, nationality, familial, or
secondary nationality. In the context of state dissolution, for example,
the states concerned would be required to provide a right of option for
those people "who would be entitled to acquire the nationality of two or
more successor States."'' ° This requirement ensures that an individual
may obtain the effective nationality of the successor state with which
that individual has the most effective links. In state successions involving the separation of part of the territory, the Draft Articles would
require both the successor state and the predecessor state to grant a right
of option to all persons concerned. °1 This provision also helps ensure
that those persons who qualify for the nationality of both the predecessor and successor states obtain the nationality which most closely
accords with their genuine effective links. °2
100. Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 17. The right of option in state dissolution
must also be granted to "persons concerned who have their habitual residence in a third State
and who are not covered by the provisions of article 20, paragraph (b), irrespective of the
mode of acquisition of the nationality of the predecessor State." Mikulka, Third Report, supra, at 9. This right essentially covers persons who obtained nationality of the predecessor
state but who have never lived in the predecessor state, for example children or spouses of
overseas nationals.
101. See id. art. 25, at 18.
102. Brownlie wrongly minimized the importance of the right of option in state successions: "Provisions for rights of option, as has been suggested earlier, do not alter things very
much since, in general, the option is to throw off a nationality acquired, or assumed to exist
or be about to exist, as a result of the transfer of sovereignty." Brownlie, supra note 30, at
324. As noted above, for individuals who qualify for the nationality of more than one state
concerned in a succession, the right of option is a very useful tool for enabling those persons
to obtain nationality in the state with which it has the closer and more effective links. The
failure of the post-Soviet Republics to introduce a coordinated right of option into their respective nationality legislation, or through international instruments, has created ongoing
problems of statelessness-particularly among ethnic groups who had been deported from
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The Draft Articles thus utilize a mix of criteria for states to use in
determining effective nationality, emphasizing domicile as the predominant criterion, but also including prior nationality, prior secondary
nationality, '°3 and familial links in which nationality is obtained through
principles of jus sanguinis. And they provide in some contexts for the
right of option, which enables individuals to obtain the nationality of the
state with which they have the strongest and most effective links.
From some of the detailed obligations on states proposed in the
Draft Articles on Nationality in relation to the Succession of States,"
and from the legal opinions, declarations, and draft instruments of international organizations,'O' the clear trend in international law is toward
the imposition of positive obligations on states deriving from the principle of effective nationality enunciated in Nottebohm, at least in the
context of state successions. But the principles set forth in the Draft Articles or these other instruments are not yet descriptive of the lex lata.
Reference has already been made to the absence of state practice evincing opinio juris.Reference has also been made to the lack of consensus
among delegations to the ILC and in the Sixth Committee as to the existence of international obligations binding upon states regarding the
conferral of nationality following state successions. Nevertheless, the
body of principles contained in the Draft Articles illustrate the rapid
development of international law in this area.

one part of the Soviet Union to another, such as the Crimean Tatars. See, e.g., Blackman,
Statelessness in Ukraine, supra note 16.

103. In defending the utility of using secondary nationality as a criterion in state succession, Mikulka has made a serious factual error: "As ... the practice of the Czech Republic
shows, nearly all persons concerned [who were] habitually resident in its territory who did
not acquire Czech nationality by virtue of the ... ex lege criterion, acquired Czech nationality via optional application under the Czech legislation. Thus, the outcome of the application
of this criterion was not substantially different from the situation which would have resulted
from the use of the criterion of permanent residence." Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8,
at 32. This is simply not true. The legislative restrictions placed on the right of option dis-

qualified from Czech citizenship a substantial number of persons who had habitual residence
in the Czech Republic at the time of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia-most of whom were
ethnic Roma, a population widely disliked by the ethnic majority. See Blackman, supra note
16; The Czech and Slovak Citizenship Laws and the Problem of Statelessness, supra note 16;
Report of the Experts of the Council of Europe on the Citizenship Laws of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and their Implementation (April 2, 1996). Mikulka, who lives in the Czech

Republic and is an expert on nationality issues, is surely aware of the well-publicized international controversy surrounding the fate of the country's Roma under his own country's
nationality legislation.
104. There are a number of provisions further illustrative of the point under discussion
that have been omitted for the sake of brevity.

105. See discussion supra pp. 15-16.
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F. Human Rights Obligations
Although the law of diplomatic protection has been the context in
which restrictions on state discretion over nationality legislation have
emerged, and although the Nottebohm case gave impetus to the principle
of effective nationality, the law of human rights has fueled the rapid development toward positive obligations on states with respect to
nationality. In developing and codifying the law pertaining to nationality
as it relates to state successions, the International Law Commission has
had to confront a rapidly evolving body of international human rights
principles. As the Special Rapporteur explained:
Aside from its traditional role of delimiting the competence of
States in the area of nationality, international law imposes yet
another, long-recognized, limitation on their freedom, which derives from principles concerning the protection of human
rights.... The importance of this second type of limitation increased considerably after the Second World War. ...By virtue
of these norms and principles, some of the processes of internal
law, such as those leading to statelessness or any type of discrimination, have become questionable at the international level.
This is true for nationality laws in general, as well as in the particular context of State succession. It is one of the most
remarkable attributes of the developing legal framework in
which recent cases of succession have taken place."''
In the absence of these animating human rights principles, the detailed Draft Articles related to nationality in state successions could be
viewed as nothing more than the technical delimitation of the competence of respective predecessor and successor states, with legal
grounding in the fields of diplomatic protection and state succession.
Only through the incorporation of human rights principles does the
principle of effective nationality discussed above take on a positive
function with respect to states' obligations beyond the field of diplomatic protection: "[T]he legal grounds for the obligation of the
successor State to grant its nationality are ...to be found among the
rules concerning the protection of human rights, the rules regarding the
delimitation of competences between the different successor States are
of a rather different order.""0 This incorporation is particularly true with
respect to the emerging right to nationality, the corresponding duty to
prevent statelessness, and the norm of non-discrimination.
106. Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 30.
107. Mikulka, Second Report, supra note 8, at 18.
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1. The Right to a Nationality
The right to a nationality is the most obvious human rights principle
bearing on cases of state succession. With respect to the persons concerned, state succession primarily involves the allocation of nationality
among the predecessor state and successor state(s). Any rights under
international law that relate to nationality thus impinge directly on the
freedom of the states involved in a state succession.
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set out for
the first time the individual right to a nationality:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2.

No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality."
Although Article 15 was a groundbreaking provision in international law,"" the article's vagueness has robbed it of any immediate
force. Most significantly, Article 15 does not carry a specific corresponding obligation on states to confer nationality. In other words the
article fails to indicate precisely to which nationality one has the right
and under what circumstances that right arises.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), one of the two covenants intended to give more detailed
legal effect to the Universal Declaration, curiously omits reference to
the right to nationality in Article 15 of the Declaration. The only mention of nationality at all is in Article 24, which provides that "[e]very
child has the right to acquire a nationality."" 0 Again, the provision is
undermined by the failure to specify upon whom a corresponding obligation to grant nationality falls. Johannes Chan, in his examination of
the travaux preparatoiresto the ICCPR, concluded that the complexity
of this problem resulted in this Covenant's exclusion of a general right
to nationality. " ' Agreeing with that assessment is not difficult, judging
by the volume of documentation and deliberation in connection with the
current ILC efforts to codify and develop nationality principles even in
the narrow context of state succession.

108. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, at 4.
109. Article 15 does have antecedents in the 1930 Hague Convention, which laid out
principles for avoiding the negative conflicts of law, particularly among jus soli states and jus
sanguinis states, that sometimes result in statelessness for expatriated or naturalized persons,
spouses of foreign nationals, children of mixed nationals, and adopted children.
110. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reprinted in U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, at 29.
111. Chan, supra note 44, at 4-5.
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The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness sets forth
principles which bear on the right to a nationality. Article 1(1), for example, provides that "[a] Contracting State shall grant its nationality to
a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless.""' This
Convention also sets out the specific manner and timing of the conferral.
The convention establishes further affirmative obligations on states to
confer nationality in Article 1(3), 1(4) and 4, which specify the procedural manner in which the obligation operates."' The Convention is
cited here because for many years it contained among the very few substantive provisions in international law related to the right to a
nationality, scant though those cited provisions may be. Such was the
neglect of the right to a nationality in general international law.
The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights reiterates the
right to a nationality found in the Declaration on Human Rights and expands it significantly. Article 20 provides that "[e]very person has the
right to the nationality of the State in whose territory he was born if he
does not have the right to any other nationality.""14 This article is a simpler, unqualified application of the principle set forth in Article 4 of the
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
The Draft Articles on Nationality in Relation to the Succession of
States currently under consideration by the ILC is without doubt the
most significant general elaboration of the right to nationality since the
right was introduced in Article 15 of the Declaration on Human Rights.
Article 1 of the Draft Articles provides:
1. Every individual who, on the date of the succession of States,
had the nationality of the predecessor State, irrespective of the
mode of acquisition of that nationality, or was entitled to acquire such nationality in accordance with the provisions of the
internal law of the predecessor State, has the right to the nationality of at least one of the States concerned.
Here is a clear definition of precisely who has the right to a nationality, in exactly what circumstances, and specifically which states carry
the corresponding obligation to confer nationality. Article 1 is that rarity
in international human rights instruments relating to nationality. The
reason for this clear elaboration, however, is unexceptional. As the

112. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, at 616.

113. See infra text accompanying notes 128-130.
114. Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, reprinted in London School of

Economics, Masters of Laws Programme, International Protection of Human Rights: International Human Rights Texts.
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comment to the article shows, the right is being applied to a narrowed
range of state actors:
Paragraph 1 can be viewed as an application of the general concept of the right to a nationality.... Despite the fact that the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have
given rise to different interpretations in the Commission, it
seems that the existence of the right to a nationality is accepted
in situations where it is possible to determine the State vis-a-vis
which the person concerned would be entitled to present a claim
for nationality.... In the context of State succession, such determination is feasible."'
Yet on closer reading, Article 1 does not precisely identify the specific state in which an obligation to confer nationality arises from the
right to a nationality. State successions vary too much in form for a general article to apply in this manner. Although the unification of states
results in only one state actor-and as such the obligation to confer nationality may be isolated in one state-in other types of state succession
more than one state are involved, and the right to a nationality implicates corresponding obligations in more than one state. The person with
a right to a nationality under Article 1 may have the right to obtain nationality from any number of successor states, or of the predecessor
state, or conceivably, from some combination thereof.
Accordingly, the right embodied in paragraph 1 in the most
general terms has to be given more concrete form .... The
identification of the State which is under the obligation to grant
such right depends upon the type of succession of States and the
nature of the links that persons
concerned may have with one or
'6
more States concerned. 1
More precise identification is undertaken in the articles which correspond to the four categories of state succession, discussed above in
greater detail," 7 as well as to the related provisions for the right of option. The provisions applying the principle of effective link to the
specific categories of state succession-although using terminology borrowed from the area of diplomatic protection-are in fact an application
of concepts found in human rights law, namely the right to a nationality:
This approach is in harmony with the opinion voiced by some
members of the [International Law] Commission that, if a right
115. Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 35-36 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 36.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 33-41.
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to nationality were recognized, there was first a need to identify
a genuine link between the person and the State obligated to
grant its nationality. In other words, the concept of an individual's right to a nationality within the context of State succession
could be better pinpointed through the application of the criterion of genuine link." 11'
The human rights basis for the principle of effective nationality is
thus made clearer.
One may wonder why the Commission's approach to the right of
nationality in the context of state succession cannot be generalized beyond state successions to encompass all states. The individual right to a
nationality does not implicate a greater number of states generally than
it does in the specific context of state successions. The vast majority of
people on this planet have effective links with only one state, and the
individual right to nationality for such people can only give rise to a corresponding obligation of but one state to confer nationality. For most of
humanity the right to a nationality and its corollary state obligation
should be easy to pinpoint. It is true in an age of global travel many
people have effective links to more than one state, many people are
domiciled for long periods overseas, and the right to nationality for
these individuals could involve the corollary obligations of more than
one state. But rarely would the right to nationality involve more states
than does the context of state successions. These state successions inherently involve more than one state, sometimes several states.
If the Commission has been able to develop techniques for identifying which of several states in a succession has the obligation to give
effect to an individual's right of nationality, then no logical reason exists
as to why the same techniques cannot be extended to states generally.
The Special Rapporteur's following comment with regard to state succession can apply just as easily to all nationality cases:
[T]here is no reason to deny the 'right to a nationality' to most
individuals just because for some others the identification of the
State upon which [the corollary obligation to grant nationality]
falls is more difficult.... [E]ven for those individuals who may
have links to two or more States concerned, the identification of
the above State need not be a real problem, provided that a right
of choice (option) is recognized for such persons as part of their
right to a nationality." 9

118. Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 36.

119. Id. at 37.
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Rather, the question is one of political will, not of undue legal or
factual complexity.
Finally, paragraph 2 of Draft Article 1 applies the principle of Article 24 of the ICCPR, the right of every child to a nationality, and of
Article 1 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
Paragraph 2 provides that:
2. If a child born after the date of the succession of States whose
parent is [an individual who, on the date of the succession of
States, had the nationality of the predecessor State] has not acquired the nationality of at least one of the States concerned, or
that of a third State, such child has the right to acquire the nationality of the State concerned on whose territory ... he or she
was born. 2°
The Special Rapporteur, in his comments to this article, indicated
that this provision followed from an application of the ICCPR, the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, and Article 7 of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child. The comments seem to imply that he views this
particular provision as a declaration of lex lata, rather than an effort to
develop lexferenda. This is a significant marker in the evolution of the
right to a nationality.
Paragraph 1 of Draft Article 1, however, setting forth the general
right to a nationality, should probably not be viewed as declarative of
existing law. The right to nationality is probably not part of customary
international law, given the few international instruments which mention
the right and the absence of uniform state practice and opinio juris. It is,
nevertheless, one of many strands in international law bearing on the
emerging right to an effective nationality, at least in the context of state
succession.
2. The Duty to Avoid Statelessness
Closely related to the right of nationality is the duty to prevent
statelessness. This duty may be conceived of as a negative duty arising
from the right to nationality-although provisions aimed at reducing
statelessness existed in international instruments prior to the introduction of the right to nationality in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Statelessness is, simply put, the legal condition of being without a
nationality. 2 ' Given the importance that attaches to nationality, both
120. Id. at 10.
121. Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines
"stateless person" simply as someone "who is not considered as a national by any State un-
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under international law and national law, being stateless effectively renders the individual concerned unable to enjoy the rights and protections
afforded by
law. The stateless person has therefore been referred to as a
12 2
non-entity.
Statelessness is caused by the loss of nationality without the acquisition of another nationality, whether by deprivation or by the negative
conflict of laws. Statelessness may also result at birth when the child
fails to qualify for the nationality of any particular state. These two basic causes have been regulated differently by international law, with
statelessness at birth receiving far more sympathy.
The 1930 Hague Convention was the first attempt to impose obligations on states with respect to statelessness under international law. It
regulated a range of issues that frequently caused (and still cause)
statelessness resulting from the negative conflict of law, including technical matters such as the issuance of expatriation permits (Article 7),
matters related to marriage and divorce (Articles 8-11), matters related
to the effect of naturalization on dependent children (Article 13), the
birth of a child to unknown or stateless parents (Articles 14-15), the
legitimization of "illegitimate" children (Article 16), and the adoption
of children (Article 17). Most of these provisions stipulated that if the
national laws of a state provided for the automatic loss of nationality
upon, for example, expatriation, or marriage, such loss would be
deemed conditional on the acquisition of an alternative nationality. In
this regard, the Convention was very useful in harmonizing a great deal
of conflicting nationality legislation, and its provisions are echoed today
in the nationality acts of many countries,'23 which has no doubt contributed to the reduction of statelessness.
The Convention did set out two independent obligations on states
which did not relate to technical conflicts of law. The first involved the
obligation of a state to confer nationality on a child born on its territory
whose parents were unknown.1 24 The second, permissive in nature, related to children born to stateless parents: "Where the nationality of a
State is not acquired automatically by reason of birth on its territory, a
child born on the territory of that State of parents having no nationality,
or of unknown nationality, may obtain the nationality of the said
der the operation of its law.", reprinted in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note

32, vol. 1,pt. 2, at 625.
122. See Paul Weis, The United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
1961, 11 INT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 1073 (1972).

123. The provisions that related to the married women, moreover, were reiterated and
strengthened by the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, reprinted in
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, vol. 1, pt. 2, at 611.
124. 1930 Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 14.
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State.""' A Protocol to the Convention stiffened the permissive language
into a requirement in cases where the mother possessed the nationality
of the said state and the father was without or with unknown nationality." The Convention's provisions taken as a whole, however, did not
prohibit the practice of denationalization or the deprivation of nationality, which were major causes of statelessness in the late 19th century
and immediately following the First World War. Nor did the Convention
relate directly to situations involving state succession, although its general obligations would apply to a state succession mutatis mutandis.
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which sets
forth the right to a nationality, also included a provision related to
statelessness: "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality. .

,,127

The other major international instrument relating to statelessness is
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.", Article 1(1) of
the Convention provides that "[a] Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be
stateless." '29 This conferral must be done either at birth, by operation of
law, or upon application. If the latter, the state may make the application
subject to a number of procedural conditions. Article 1(3), though, requires the state to make the conferral of nationality at birth if the child is
born in wedlock and the mother has the state's nationality, echoing the
provision of the Protocol to the 1930 Convention. Article 4 slightly expands the category of persons covered by providing that "[a]
Contracting State shall grant its nationality to a person, not born in the
territory of a Contracting State, who would otherwise be stateless, if the
nationality of one of his parents at the time of the person's birth was that
of that State." The state could make the conferral of nationality under
this paragraph subject to several procedural conditions.

125. Id., art. 15.
126. Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness (April 12, 1930), 179 L.N.T.S.
115 (1937).
127. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, at 4.
128. The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons is omitted from
the discussion because it relates not so much to the obligation of a state to confer nationality,
but rather to the treatment to be accorded by a state to stateless persons residing on its territory. The 1954 Convention is essentially an instrument designed to invest stateless persons
with legal status and civil rights within the domestic jurisdiction of the state of residence,
roughly in parallel with the provisions set forth for refugees by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
129. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, at 273. Article I thus extends
the principles contained in the 1930 Hague Convention and adopts its Protocol without the
Protocol's conditions.
130. Id.
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In addition to the foregoing obligations on states to confer nationality, the Convention for the first time prohibits states parties from
depriving people of their nationality if the deprivation would result in
statelessness.13 1 Unfortunately, however, this provision was made subject
to a number of exceptions, some of them quite broad. It would, for example, permit a state party to subject a naturalized citizen to statelessness if
that person maintained residence abroad for a period of time as specified
by the state's nationality law, but not less than seven consecutive
years." Moreover, if a child were born abroad, the state of nationality
may, after the expiring of one year following the child's attaining majority age, subject that person to statelessness if that person were not at
that time resident in the state. The Convention would also permit a state
to subject a person to statelessness if that person obtained the state's
nationality by misrepresentation or fraud. Finally, the Convention permits a state to subject a national to statelessness in various instances of
failure to show proper allegiance: such as if the person rendered services
to or received payments from another state in disregard of an express
prohibition by the state of nationality; or has "conducted himself in a
manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests" of the state; or has
"taken an oath, or made a formal declaration, of allegiance to another
State, or given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his
allegiance to the Contracting State.
Article 9 places one additional limitation on a state's freedom to deprive people of their nationality: the principle of non-discrimination.
The article provides that "[a] Contracting State may not deprive any
person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds."' This provision reflects the intrusion of yet
another human rights principle into the realm of state discretion with
respect to nationality questions and applies mutatis mutandis to situations of state succession, as do the Convention's other provisions on
arbitrary deprivation of nationality.
The 1961 Convention does impose one significant obligation on
states parties in the specific context of state succession. Article 10 provides that:
1. Every treaty between Contracting States providing for the
transfer of territory shall include provisions designed to secure
that no person shall become stateless as a result of the transfer.
A Contracting State shall use its best endeavours to secure that
131.
132.
133.
134.

See
See
See
See

id. art. 8(1).
id. art. 8(2)(a).
id. art. 8(3)(a)(i)-(ii) and 8(3)(b).
id.art. 9.
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any such treaty made by it with a State which is not a Party to
this Convention includes such provisions.
2. In the absence of such provisions a Contracting State to
which territory is transferred or which otherwise acquires territory shall confer its nationality on such persons as would
otherwise become stateless as a result of the transfer or acquisition. '
States involved in a succession are thus under an affirmative duty of
assuring that no statelessness results from the succession-provided that
they have concluded a treaty for the transfer of territory. 36
In addition to the substantive obligations on states, the Convention
sets forth a range of procedural and technical provisions designed to
prevent negative conflicts of law that would result in statelessnessvery much along the lines of the provisions set out in the 1930 Hague
Convention, as discussed above. As in the case of the Hague Convention, the provisions of the 1961 Convention do not apply specifically to
instances of state successions but are general principles that apply to
successions mutatis mutandis. The most interesting, and novel, procedural provision is found in Article 11:
The Contracting States shall promote the establishment within
the framework of the United Nations ... of a body to which a
person claiming the benefit of this Convention may apply for
and for assistance in presenting it
the examination of his claim
37
to the appropriate authority.'
Therein lay the seeds for an international body to exercise international protection on behalf of stateless persons. In 1975, when the
Convention came into force, the General Assembly appointed the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to serve as the Article 11 body. 38 As a result, UNHCR has been involved in the context of
135. See id. art. 10.
136. This of course assumes that the predecessor state has ratified the 1961 Convention,
and that the successor state has established its status as a party to the Convention. See, e.g.,
1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art. Art. 17(1), reprinted in BLACKSTONE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS, supra note 5, at 254.
137. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, vol. 1,pt. 2, at 621.
138. G.A. Res. 3274, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Agenda Item 99, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3274
(XXIX) (1975); G.A. Res. 31/36, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Agenda item 78, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/31/36 (1976). Many thought that the UNHCR, which exercises protection on behalf
of stateless refugees under the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, would be the
most appropriate existing international agency to act in this capacity. The 1954 Protocol on
the Status of Stateless Persons, moreover, had originally been intended as a Protocol to the
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. See Batchelor, supra note 20, at 244. The Ex-
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several state successions, most visibly in the context of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Czechoslovakia.13 9
The UNHCR has also been requested by its Executive Committee,
which consists of a body of states, to provide interested states with relevant technical and advisory services pertaining to the preparation and
implementation of nationality legislation, and that to promote the prevention and reduction of statelessness through dissemination of
information and the training of government officials.'4 As a result,
UNHCR is taking a much more active role with states, particularly those
involved in state successions, in assuring that they avoid creating statelessness and that they resolve cases of statelessness on their territory.
In its recent elaboration of principles related to nationality in the
context of state succession, the International Law Commission clearly
faced a relatively well-developed set of principles related to the prevention of statelessness. "The assumption that States concerned should be
under the obligation to prevent statelessness was one of the basic premises on which the Working Group based its deliberations and received
clear support in the Commission."' ' 4' Likewise in the General Assembly's Sixth Committee, "statelessness has ... been generally recognized
as a serious problem deserving the primary attention of the Commission.' ' 4 That the Draft Articles contain such a tepid affirmation of the
duty to prevent statelessness is, therefore, surprising: "The States concerned are under the obligation to take all reasonable measures to avoid
persons who, on the date of the succession of States, had the nationality
of the predecessor43State becoming stateless as a result of the said succession of States."'
Aside from the poor draftmanship displayed-one supposes that
states will be more than willing to "avoid persons [who are] becoming
stateless" (and already tend do so in practice)-the obligation to take
"all reasonable measures" is an obligation without teeth. What constitutes "reasonable", and who makes that determination? If a successor
state confronts stateless persons on its territory resulting from the succession, will it be obliged to confer nationality as a "reasonable
measure"? Would its refusal to do so be considered "unreasonable"?
Nothing in the Comment to the article provides guidance on this crucial
ecutive Committee's Conclusion was subsequently confirmed by General Assembly Resolution 50/152, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/152 (February 9, 1996).
139. See Blackman, supra note 16; The Czech and Slovak Citizenship Laws and the
Problem of Statelessness, supra note 16.
140. U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/860 (October 23, 1995), 20.
141. Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 43 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 44.
143. Draft Article 2, in Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 10.
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point. Perhaps, given the obligatory language in the articles relating to
each category of state succession,' " the provision that states avoid
statelessness is redundant: states would already be obliged to do more
than merely avoid creating statelessness among nationals of the predecessor state; they would be obliged to confer their nationality on such
nationals. Nevertheless, the provisions related to conferral of nationality
are most probably in the realm of lexferenda, whereas the duty to prevent statelessness is a principle with a stronger pedigree under
international law, including obligatory language in instruments dating
back nearly 70 years. The Commission has done the principle a disservice by casting it in such permissive language.
The duty to prevent statelessness as formulated in Article 2 only
extends to nationals of the predecessor state on the date of the state succession. The state is under no obligation with respect to those people
residing on the territory of the successor state who had been stateless in
the predecessor state. The state, of course, has the discretion to confer
14
nationality on such people but is not under an obligation to do so.
The draft articles also set out several other provisions related to the
duty to prevent statelessness. These draft articles include the standard
procedural device that renunciation of nationality as part of acquiring
the nationality of another state not result in statelessness (Article 5,
8(2)), the application to state successions of the principle of no arbitrary
deprivation of nationality (Article 13), and a novel obligation in Article
15 that:
States concerned are under the obligation to consult in order to
identify any detrimental effects that may result from the succession of States with respect to the nationality of individuals and
other related issues concerning their status and, as the case may
be, to seek a solution of those problems through negotiations.'"
Regarding this latter obligation, the Special Rapporteur's report
noted that "[d]uring the debate in the Sixth Committee, satisfaction was
especially expressed with the Working Group's position that negotiations should be aimed, in particular, at the prevention of statelessness.' ' 7
One wonders, therefore, why the "obligation to consult" set out in Article 15 did not specifically name the prevention of statelessness as
one of the "detrimental effects" to be negotiated and resolved. Moreover, the question arises why the Draft Articles do not include a
144. See discussion supra pp. 18-21.
145. See O'CONNELL, supra note 29, at 517.
146. Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 14.
147. Id. at 96.
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provision mirroring that of Article 10 in the 1961 Convention, which
requires that every treaty between states providing for the transfer of
territory "shall include provisions designed to secure that no person
shall become stateless as a result of the transfer." Instead of an explicit
provision aimed at avoiding statelessness, such as Article 10, which has
been in force for twenty-two years, the Draft Articles have put forth an
"obligation to consult" which does not even mention the prevention of
statelessness as an object of consultation. This despite the Special Rapporteur's statement that "[t]he most effective measure that the States
concerned may take is to conclude an agreement by virtue of which the
occurrence of statelessness would be precluded."'48
Although a general right to a nationality has not become part of
customary international law, the trend in international law suggests a
strong presumption in favor of the prevention of statelessness in any
change of nationality, including in a state succession. While a state may
not have a positive obligation to confer its nationality on anyone, a state
may have at least a negative duty not to create statelessness. This can be
conceived both as a corollary to the emerging individual right to a nationality and as an independent obligation ergo omnes.
3. The Norm of Non-Discrimination
Non-discrimination, or the principle of equal treatment, is another
principle of international human rights law that bears directly on the
issue of nationality in the context of state succession.
The principle of non-discrimination is set forth in numerous international instruments, with antecedents dating back at least to the
minority treaties regime following World War L 9The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains a non-discrimination clause in Article
2: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status." 5° Among the "rights ...set forth in this
15 are included, in Article 15, the right to a nationality.
Declaration""
148. Id. at 42.
149. See, e.g., Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64 (April 6,
1935) at 4-36. See also Acquisition of Polish Nationality, supra note 37, at 15 ("One of the
first problems which presented itself in connection with the protection of minorities
[following the creation of states subsequent to World War I] was that of preventing these
[new states] from refusing their nationality, on racial, religious or linguistic grounds, to certain categories of persons, in spite of the link which effectively attached them to the territory
allocated to one or other of these States").
150. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 108, art. 2.
151. Id., art. 2, para. 1.
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Article 9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
prohibits states parties from depriving "any person or group of persons
of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds."'"
This provision, while not directly related to the conferral or withholding
of nationality on a discriminatory basis, is at least a negative application
of that principle to the context of statelessness. The duty to avoid statelessness may thus be said to encompass an element of non-discrimination.
The principle of non-discrimination is perhaps nowhere set out
more famously than in Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth
53
status.
or other
On the face of Article 26, the provisions for equality and nondiscrimination are not confined in application to the rights set forth in
the Covenant. The provisions operate whenever the State exercises its
legislative authority. The ICCPR Human Rights Committee adopted this
view:
In the view of the Committee, article 26 does not merely duplicate the guarantee already provided for in article 2 but provides
in itself an autonomous right. It prohibits discrimination in law
or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public authorities. Article 26 is therefore concerned with the obligations
imposed on States parties in regard to their legislation and the
application thereof. Thus, when legislation is adopted by a State
party, it must comply with the requirement of article 26 that its
content should not be discriminatory. In other words, the application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article
26 is not limited to those rights which are .provided for in the
Covenant. "

152. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 32.

153. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 26, reprinted in U.N.
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, at 28.

154. General Comment No. 18. Non-discrimination CCPR/C/21/Rev. I/Add. 1. The
Committee has, moreover, applied Article 26 in this manner in several individual communications. See Broeks v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 172/1984, reprinted in London
School of Economics, Masters of Laws Programme, International Protection of Human
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Article 26 of the ICCPR is the most significant non-discrimination
provision in the context of nationality, because Article 26 applies
autonomously to all legislative acts by states, including nationality legislation, and not merely those in furtherance of the other rights secured
by the Covenant.
In the European context, Article 5 of the European Convention on
Nationality includes a general prohibition of discrimination in matters
of nationality, prohibiting states from adopting nationality legislation
that makes distinctions on grounds of sex, religion, race, color or national or ethnic origin. Article 18 of the3 5Convention also applies this
provision to situations of state succession.
The emergence of the norm of non-discrimination in international
law has been duly noted by the International Law Commission in its
current deliberations: "During the Commission's debate ... emphasis
was placed upon the obligation of non-discrimination which international law imposes on all States and which is also applicable to
nationality, including in the case of a succession of States. 5 6 Likewise,
the representatives in the Sixth Committee "expressed their agreement
with the Working Group's preliminary conclusion that States had the
duty to refrain from applying discriminatory criteria, such as ethnicity,
religion or language, in the granting or revoking of nationality in the
context of State succession.' 57 Accordingly, the Commission's Draft
Articles on Nationality in relation to the Succession of States expressly
prohibits states from applying discriminatory criteria in withdrawing or
granting nationality or when providing for the right of option. Article 12
states that:
When withdrawing or granting their nationality, or when providing for the right of option, the States concerned shall not
apply criteria based on ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural
Rights: International Human Rights Texts 665, in which the Committee found The Netherlands in breach of Article 26 by denying women social security benefits on an equal basis as
men, despite the fact that the ICCPR nowhere requires states to provide social security benefits:
Although article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does

not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any State to enact
legislation to provide for social security. However, when such legislation is
adopted in the exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must
comply with article 26 of the Covenant.
See also Dannig v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 180/1984; Zwaan-de Vries v.
The Netherlands; and Gueye v. France, Communication No. 196/1985, reprinted at id.
155. See Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 90.
156. Id.

157. Id. at 91-92.

1186

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 19:1141

considerations if, by so doing, they would deny the persons
concerned the right to retain or acquire a nationality or would
deny those persons their right of option, to which such persons
would otherwise be entitled." 8
Given the predominance of ethnic conflict involved in state successions, this provision is necessary and welcome. But one cannot help but
express dismay at the qualifying language, which can be read to create
broad and unjustifiable exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination.
Article 12 appears to be intended to prohibit successor and predecessor
states from discriminating in granting or withdrawing nationality when
this would result in denying nationality to persons who would otherwise
be entitled to the nationality of one or more of the states concerned. For
example, if an individual has the right to nationality in state A and state
B, the states concerned may not contrive to apply discriminatory criteria
resulting in the denial of nationality in state A. The non-discrimination
provision would prevent states in a succession from assigning a minority
group to one state or another, whether to preserve ethnic purity or as
part of some broader agreement.
Unfortunately, the ambiguous way in which the provision is drafted
admits a reading that would permit precisely those scenarios. The problem is with the final modifying phrase in the conditional clause ("to
which such persons would otherwise be entitled"): whether that phrase
modifies the entire conditional clause ("if, by so doing .... "),or
whether that phrase modifies only the third of the three conditions in the
clause ("or would deny those persons their right of option."), which immediately precedes it, is not clear. As a whole, the provision only
prohibits states from applying discriminatory nationality criteria when
the provision would "deny the persons concerned the right to retain or
acquire a nationality or would deny those persons their right of option,
to which such persons would otherwise be entitled [emphasis added]."'5 9
If this final modifying phrase is restricted to the third condition, then the
language as drafted would permit the states concerned to apply discriminatory criteria, so long as the persons concerned still had the right
to retain or acquire a nationality, any nationality, in one of the states
involved in the succession, and provided that the states did not "deny
those persons their right of option, to which such persons would otherwise be entitled." According to this reading, state A and state B may
contrive, by introducing discriminatory nationality criteria, to exclude
members of an ethnic minority group from nationality in state A, so
158. Id. at 14.
159. Id.
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long as these individuals still had the right to a nationality in state B,
and so long as the states did not deny those persons a right of option to
which they were entitled (a right which is largely illusory under the
draft articles, as will be seen). This reading would, in effect, restrict the
principle of non-discrimination to the narrow context of de jure statelessness: the non-discrimination provision prohibits states concerned
from applying discriminatory criteria only when the result would be the
denial of a nationality, or in other words, statelessness. This inadvertent
circumscription of the non-discrimination principle could hold ominous
practical implications for minority groups caught up in a state succession-precisely the issue that spurred urgent attention to strengthening
the international law governing state succession.
The final phrase of the qualifying clause, now read restrictively to
apply solely to the denial of the right of option, does not by itself provide a cure for this defect. The phrase would prohibit the application of
discriminatory criteria if this would "deny the persons concerned ...
their right of option, to which such persons would otherwise be entitled." Even using this restrictive reading, the provision might yet have
been effective if persons concerned were widely and effectively entitled
to the right of option. If this interpretation had been adopted the application of discriminatory nationality criteria would almost always
operate to "deny the persons concerned ...their right of option, to
which such persons would otherwise be entitled." But the right of option
is not at all so broad or so effective. It is made voluntary by Article 7
and is limited to instances of statelessness: "[T]he legislation of a State
concerned should provide for the right of option for. the nationality of
that State by any person concerned who has a genuine link with that
State if the person would otherwise become stateless as a consequence
of the succession of States.' ' "° States should provide the right of option if
statelessness would otherwise ensue, but the matter is purely discretionary under the draft articles.
The right of option is attached to two of the four specific categories
of state succession-namely dissolution of a state and the separation of
part of a state's territory."' But the right of option in those provisions
would not necessarily operate within Article 12 to prevent a state from
applying discriminatory criteria. The Special Rapporteur has made clear
that those provisions belong to the realm of lex ferenda'62 As for the
160. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
161. Articles 21 and 25, respectively.
162.
[T]he principles in Part II [relating to the four categories of state succession] are
intended mainly to facilitate negotiations between the States concerned or to en-
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second category mentioned, the transfer of a part of a state's territory,
the right of option pertains only to the predecessor state; the successor
state is under no obligation to extend a right of option and is not, under
this restrictive reading of Article 12, constrained from applying discriminatory criteria within the meaning of Article 12. As for the other
relevant category-that of transfer of a part of a state's territory-no
provisions mandate the right of option. This right is regulated only by
the general voluntary provision of Article 7.
In this way poor drafting has marred the draft article that applies the
principle of non-discrimination in the context of state succession. Language from optional provisions of the draft articles, designated as lex
ferenda by the ILC, has been used to qualify a principle that is broadly
established as lex lata elsewhere under international law without such
qualifications. A general non-discrimination principle has been narrowed down essentially to a provision that operates to avoid
statelessness, but which does so on terms less satisfactory than those
that already exist in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. In light of the autonomous non-discrimination norm set forth in
Article 26 of the ICCPR, one wonders why the Special Rapporteur has
included any qualifying language at all on the non-discrimination principle in the context of state succession.
The autonomous principle of non-discrimination is particularly important in the context of state succession. A new state is by definition
confronted with the issue of creating its identity, a process that is accomplished not only through its assertion of new borders but also, more
importantly, through the definition of itself as a people. Indeed, state
successions are frequently sparked by the determination of one group in
a state to define their identity as against other groups in that state, often
in negative and hateful terms of "us" and "them". Nationality legislation
is central to this effort at self-definition, and recent state successions
have been characterized by the effort of successor states to exclude a
particular ethnic group from obtaining citizenship in the new state.
courage their lawmaking efforts. They offer the States concerned certain
'technical' solutions to the problems which arise. The States concerned can base

their agreement on the solutions thus proposed. At the same time they can, in the
course of their negotiations, find solutions that are more appropriate and better
adapted to the needs of the specific situation, and, by agreement, base their respective laws on them.
Mikulka, Third Report, supra note 8, at 7. In other words, these provisions are optional
principles to be used or ignored by the states concerned.
163. Putting aside the issue of whether the Baltic States may properly be considered a
state succession, rather than the resumption of pre-existing sovereignty, the reinstatement by

Estonia and Latvia of nationality laws that existed prior to the incorporation of those states
into the Soviet Union, which included local language requirements for naturalization, had the
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This type of exclusionary legislation would seem already to be prohibited by the Covenant's non-discrimination provision in Article 26. As
one author noted:
Applied to nationality, the principle of non-discrimination has
been interpreted to mean that every habitual or permanent resident's access to a new nationality in a case of state succession
should be guaranteed regardless of race, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, etc.... When a
change of sovereignty takes place, the habitual or permanent
residents of the territory constitute an undifferentiated body in
terms of legal link, as a result of which there are no
'permissible' grounds for distinguishing among them. A state
must, simply, be held to the highest standards of international
human rights regulation both treaty based, where applicable,
and of a customary law nature. Among them the principle of
non-discrimination figures most prominently.'64
One wonders, therefore, why the draft articles qualify the principle
of non-discrimination, when the autonomous operation of Article 26 of
the ICCPR appears already to preclude successor states from adopting
nationality that is discriminatory on grounds of "race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status."' 165 The ILC's efforts in this regard are excessively cautious.
Particularly useful, in the context of state succession, is the international authorities' interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination
as encompassing not only discriminatory intent, but also discriminatory
effects. After all, the nationality legislation adopted by recent successor
states have not clearly signalled an intent to exclude certain minorities
from citizenship in the new state. Rather, states have adopted and applied objective criteria which they knew would disproportionately affect

effect (undoubtedly intentional) of excluding from citizenship the tens of thousands of Russian-speakers who had moved into the two countries during the course of the incorporation.
The Czech Republic's nationality legislation introduced restrictions on the right of option,
specifically a clean criminal record requirement, that had an overwhelmingly disproportionate effect on the country's Roma population, consigning them as Slovak nationals despite
their birth or life-long residence on Czech territory. Similarly, Macedonia introduced a residency requirement that appears to be calculated to exclude the country's sizeable Albanian
population.
164. Pejic, supra note 16, at 4-5.

165. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 26, reprinted in U.N.
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, at 28.
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the unwanted groups.'" Although Article 26 of the ICCPR does not include a definition of discrimination, the term has been defined in other
international instruments. Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women defines discrimination as "any
distinction, exclusion or restriction ... which has the effect or purpose
of impairing ornullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise .. of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other field."'6 7 Discrimination has also been
defined in the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 61 the ILO Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation, 169and the UNESCO Convention Against
Discrimination in Education. 170 Three of the definitions define discrimination both in terms of intent and of effect; the I.L.O. Convention looks
only to intent. Consequently, proof
of discriminatory intent is not re71
quired under international law.
The ICCPR Human Rights Committee has followed this approach
by adopting the definition of discrimination set forth in the Convention
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women:
While these conventions deal only with cases of discrimination
on specific grounds, the Committee believes that the term
'discrimination' as used in the Covenant should be understood
to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose
166. Thus in the context of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, in which virtually all
Roma inhabitants of the Czech Republic were designated for historical reasons as Slovak
nationals under the internal nationality of the former federal state, such internal nationality
was adopted, at the insistence of the Czech Republic, as the primary criterion for conferring
nationality. This resulted in the initial classification of most Roma living in the Czech Republic as Slovak nationals, including many whose parents and grandparents had been born
on Czech soil. Although the right of option was widely available, the Czech nationality legislation placed a condition on the right of option-namely the clean criminal record
requirement-which disproportionately affected the Roma population. This condition, combined with an extraordinarily complicated administrative procedure for exercising the right
of option, effectively resulted in the exclusion from Czech citizenship of thousands of individual Roma, many of whom had been born on Czech territory or had been lifelong residents
thereof.
167. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, at 152.
168. Id. at 67.
169. Id. at 96-97.
170. Id. at 101-02.
171. See Anne F Bajefsky, The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law, 11 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 9 (1990).
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or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and
freedoms."'
The principle of non-discrimination in international law, as set forth
most prominently by Article 26 of the ICCPR, would therefore already
prohibit the types of nationality legislation adopted by some successor
states in the latest round of state successions in Europe, where the legislation is discriminatory in intent or in effect. The draft articles thus fall
short of the international legal principles already applicable to nationality as it relates to state succession.
G. Conclusion: The Emerging Right to an Effective
Nationalityin State Successions
This paper has tried to draw together several strands of international
legal principles bearing upon the conferral of nationality within the
context of state succession. International law is evolving on this issue
from the strictly negative function of delimiting the competence of
states in their attribution of nationality toward the assigning of positive
obligations on states to confer the nationality which accords with the
genuine effective links of the persons concerned. The latter concept has
been informed largely by the human rights principles which have developed over the past fifty years, which stress individual rights and positive
obligations on states in their treatment of people. In particular, the right
to a nationality, the duty to avoid statelessness, and the norm of nondiscrimination have emerged to present affirmative obligations, or at
least presumptions, on states in their granting and withdrawal of nationality.
These disparate but related principles of international law are
becoming fused in the crucible of state succession. The view is
increasingly expressed in international fora that states involved in a
172. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32. On the other hand, "[t]he right
to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law without any discrimination does
not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable

and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of
article 26." Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands, id. Indeed, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights has concluded that within a state's sovereignty over nationality questions is
the authority to accord special treatment to aliens who would more easily and rapidly assimilate within the national community and identify its traditional beliefs, values and
institutions. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization provisions of the Constitution of

Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984, 79 I.L.R. 283, 301, para. 59. In
the present context, however, measures aimed at excluding an ethnic group from citizenship
would be based on neither reasonable nor objective criteria. Furthermore, that such measures
would assist in identifying aliens who would be more amenable to becoming a national.
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succession have the positive obligation to confer nationality on the
individuals who possess genuine effective links to the territory in
question. Put another way, there is an emerging right to an effective
nationality in that state with which an individual possesses genuine and
effective links-at least in the context of state successions, where the
states bearing the correlative obligation to confer nationality may be
isolated and the population concerned is an as yet undifferentiated body
of individuals to whom the new state owes equal protection of the law
and non-discrimination in the law's application. This emerging right to
an effective nationality in the context of state succession is finding
expression in several recent international instruments-including the
European Convention on Nationality, the Declaration on the
Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of Natural
Persons, and the Ottawa Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly-as well as in the recently strengthened mandate of the
UNHCR with respect to statelessness as the agency described in Article
11 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
The International Law Commission's effort to develop and codify
the law in this area is the most significant current development in this
field. As has been seen from reflecting on the ILC's work to date, the
legal principles of state succession with respect to the nationality of persons affected are developing very rapidly. The law in this area of state
succession has quickly evolved to encompass international human rights
norms. But the ILC has taken a cautious view of the legal trends in this
area, perhaps too cautious in an exercise meant in part to develop progressively the lex ferenda. The Commission's deliberations have
admittedly travelled considerable intellectual distance on the subjectfrom treating the topic as a matter thinly regulated by the international
law of state succession and of diplomatic protection-to treating it as a
matter directly affected by international human rights norms.
Nevertheless, the ILC has stopped short of drawing out the full implications of applicable human rights norms, particularly given how
rapidly these norms have been evolving. It has taken a conservative view
74
on the right to a nationality,' on the principle of effective nationality,'
and especially on the implications of the principle of nondiscrimination,' particularly as those norms relate to the obligation of
successor states to grant nationality to some core of its population. The
Commission has undercut the principle of non-discrimination through
its clumsy use of qualifying language in Draft Article 12. Yet in practice
173. See, e.g., Mikulka, Second Report, supra note 8,1 19.
174. See, e.g., id. I 27-33, 44-47.
175. See id.,

31,45-47.
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one of the most serious issues arising out of recent state successions has
been the use by successor states of nationality legislation to exclude
unwanted ethnic minorities from becoming citizens-leaving large
numbers of people disenfranchised and rendering them aliens vulnerable
to expulsion measures.' International law has thus far proven wholly
inadequate to address this specific issue. If the present ILC exercise of
developing international law in this area is to be effective, a more robust
approach to fleshing out the applicable legal norms is required.'77
Finally, "nationality in relation to state succession" is becoming legally indistinguishable from nationality issues generally. The distinction
already had been presciently called into question by Professor Ian
Brownlie over thirty years ago.' 7' This distinction is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as nationality issues come to be regulated by
international human rights norms, which do not easily admit distinction:
stateless people are stateless regardless of the fact of a state succession;
discriminatory domestic nationality legislation is discriminatory
whether or not it issues from a successor state. That the right to a nationality, as applied by the draft articles to instances of state succession,
cannot also be applied to states generally is not logical. The distinction
of state succession in this area will retain its significance less as a matter
of logic and law than as a matter of fact, to which human rights norms
will apply generally, and which will continue to spur the development of
those norms in response to some of the disturbing episodes of state succession that will inevitably arise again.
These recent episodes illustrated the limits to the international legal
system as it is currently configured and provoked the sobering rediscovery that nation-states have always been created through bloodshed.
176. These include, for example, the exclusionary citizenship laws adopted by most
states of the former Yugoslavia (directed at various ethnic groups), by the Baltic states

(directed at ethnic Russians), and by the Czech Republic (directed at ethnic Roma, a charge
the Czech authorities continue implausibly to deny).
177. The Draft Articles to be discussed at the forty-ninth session of the ILC, which are
currently unpublished, do indeed contain a stronger statement of legal principles and a much
clearer recognition of specific duties on successor states with respect to nationality questions. As such it marks a departure from the previous discussions of the ILC and in the Sixth

Committee. It will be interesting to see what form these Draft Articles will take following
another round of discussions within the ILC and the Sixth Committee.
178. Ian Brownlie regarded the rubric of state succession as
one of convenience and a matter of convention .... [N]o help is to be derived
from the categories of the law of State succession. Indeed, in view of the rule that
every State must have a determinate population (as an element of its statehood),
and therefore nationality always has an international aspect, there is no very fundamental distinction between the issue of statehood and that of transfer of

territory.
Brownlie, supra note 30, at 319.
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Today's observer must surely wonder whether humankind will ever find
the capacity to banish the bloody process by which its states are created.
Faced with these seemingly intractable human habits, international lawyers may be tempted to despair of solutions, particularly in a legal
regime in which the state-that creature of bloodshed-is the central
actor. Yet if a solution is to be found it will surely entail an assertion of
law against the continuum of force. With this objective in mind, international lawyers must continue to chip away at the ethnic conflict that
fuels the death and birth of states, developing the legal mechanisms
necessary to prevent ethnic tension from exploding into the destruction
of human societies. This effort must involve, at the outset, imposing an
affirmative duty on states, new and old, not to disenfranchise minorities
through domestic nationality legislation.

